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 1413 
PUTTING THE PERSON IN PHOSITA:  
THE HUMAN’S OBVIOUS ROLE IN THE 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ERA 
Abstract: Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have enabled the technology to 
contribute significantly to the development of patentable inventions. These ad-
vances, which allow AI to augment inventors’ problem solving capabilities, or 
perhaps even create inventions autonomously, have raised concerns regarding 
whether existing patent laws can adequately address the increasing role that AI 
plays in developing inventions. This tension comes to a head with patent law’s 
obviousness doctrine, which addresses the critical question: What constitutes a 
patentable invention? Is human ingenuity the sole province of patent worthy in-
vention? Should patentability be negated to the extent that AI contributes to a 
claimed invention? Current obviousness analysis allows patents on inventions 
created with AI assistance, requiring only that an invention appear nonobvious to 
a person of ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA). Although agreeing with this re-
sult in theory, some commentators argue that existing doctrine fails to account for 
the increasing role that AI plays in the process. Under the current doctrinal para-
digm, if courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office fail to account for AI’s 
role in the inventive process, this could result in too low of an obviousness stand-
ard, as they would not endow the PHOSITA with AI capabilities even when this 
technology is commonly used within a field. If the PHOSITA does not possess 
the capabilities indicative of the average skilled person in the art, then arguably 
patents will issue for undeserving inventions. This Note addresses these issues 
and argues that, despite some commentators’ concerns, the current obviousness 
test is appropriately structured to accommodate AI’s increasing role in develop-
ing inventions. Further, it challenges recent proposals intended to address per-
ceived deficiencies in the obviousness doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have enabled feats once si-
loed to the field of science fiction writing.1 AI machines have defeated the best 
humans at Jeopardy!, chess, and even the enormously complex game, Go.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Ed Newton-Rex, 59 Impressive Things Artificial Intelligence Can Do Today, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/artificial-intelligence-ai-most-impressive-achievements-
2017-3 [https://perma.cc/LP5Q-7BJQ] (noting that there are many modern applications of artificial 
intelligence (AI), including language translation, drug research, and lip-reading). 
 2 David Silver et al., A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, 
and Go Through Self-Play, 362 SCI. 1140, 1140–44 (2018); John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeop-
ardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/
17jeopardy-watson.html [https://perma.cc/6RH8-GJBS]. 
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Victories that once seemed cutting-edge now appear pedestrian compared to 
modern AI achievements, such as self-driving cars,3 “smart cities,”4 and auto-
mated cancer detection tests that outperform radiologists.5 Beyond performing 
calculations and parsing mounds of data, modern AI machines compose music, 
write news articles and poetry, paint portraits, and develop software.6 The con-
stant flow of new discoveries in AI technology propagates the narrative that AI 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Bernard Marr, Key Milestones of Waymo—Google’s Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Sept. 21, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/09/21/key-milestones-of-waymo-googles-self-
driving-cars/#3238c4685369 [https://perma.cc/7WPL-8KEN]. Waymo, owned by Google’s parent 
company, is on the cutting-edge of the race to roll out self-driving cars, with current models being 
tested on public roads in certain, preapproved areas. Id. 
 4 Zaheer Allam & Zaynah A. Dhunny, On Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Smart Cities, 89 
CITIES 80, 88 (2019). “Smart cities” feature deeply interconnected technologies that gather data relat-
ing to energy use, transportation patterns, pollution levels, and other metrics to minimize energy waste 
and environmental impact, and to enable more efficient use of a city’s infrastructure. James Ellsmoor, 
Smart Cities: The Future of Urban Development, FORBES (May 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jamesellsmoor/2019/05/19/smart-cities-the-future-of-urban-development/#574424222f90 [https://perma.
cc/9XSJ-HETX]. Currently, Toyota is building a two-thousand-person smart city in which it will test 
self-driving cars, “robot-assisted living,” and other promising technologies. Oscar Holland, Toyota Is 
Building a ‘Smart’ City to Test AI, Robots and Self-Driving Cars, CNN (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.
cnn.com/style/article/ces-toyota-big-smart-city/index.html [https://perma.cc/48D2-573Q]. Toyota’s 
CEO, Akio Toyoda, predicts that “[w]ith people [and] buildings and vehicles all connected and com-
municating with each other through data and sensors, [Toyota] will be able to test AI technology, in 
both the virtual and the physical world, maximizing its potential.” Id. 
 5 David Alayón, BioMind, Artificial Intelligence That Defeats Doctors in Tumour Diagnosis, MEDI-
UM (Aug. 8, 2018), https://medium.com/future-today/biomind-artificial-intelligence-that-defeats-
doctors-in-tumour-diagnosis-5f8ec97298b2 [https://perma.cc/22HU-CCGJ]; Hanna Ziady, Google’s 
AI System Can Beat Doctors at Detecting Breast Cancer, CNN (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/01/02/tech/google-health-breast-cancer/index.html [https://perma.cc/8HDA-QFAY]. Research-
ers are finding new ways to apply AI across many industries. EXPERT PANEL, FORBES TECH. COUN-
CIL, 13 Industries Soon to Be Revolutionized by Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/01/16/13-industries-soon-to-be-revolutionized-by-
artificial-intelligence/#5f494ca03dc1 [https://perma.cc/PBF6-CQBS]. For example, in one recent 
study, an AI program outperformed twenty experienced attorneys at reviewing five non-disclosure 
agreements for potential risks. LAWGEEX, COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE TO HUMAN LAWYERS IN THE REVIEW OF STANDARD BUSINESS CONTRACTS 2 (2018), https://
images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/397/5408/lawgeex.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G67-
EL6B]. On average, the attorneys scored eighty-five percent accuracy and completed the task in nine-
ty-two minutes. Id. at 14. The AI program reported an accuracy rate of ninety-four percent and fin-
ished the task in twenty-six seconds. Id. AI also aids journalists by generating first drafts of news 
reports, which writers can then edit and improve. Nicole Martin, Did a Robot Write This? How AI Is 
Impacting Journalism, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2019/
02/08/did-a-robot-write-this-how-ai-is-impacting-journalism/#6dacc2c47795 [https://perma.cc/63YT-
T6CK]. Similarly, at least one writer has used an AI program to help write a novel. David Streitfeld, 
Computer Stories: A.I. Is Beginning to Assist Novelists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/10/18/technology/ai-is-beginning-to-assist-novelists.html [https://perma.cc/B4XW-
9MRT]. The writer provides the AI program with the beginning of a sentence, and then the AI pro-
gram suggests different phrases to complete the sentence. Id. 
 6 Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inven-
tions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2217, 2219 
(2018). 
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creativity is limitless.7 Indeed, reports indicate the technology has become so 
sophisticated that it is capable of creating patentable inventions.8 These reports 
have caused concern among some members of the legal and technological 
communities who worry that the trajectory of AI inventiveness is on course to 
disrupt the patent system fundamentally and shake the existing patent doctrine 
to its core.9 How will a patent system created in a pre-AI world react when 
humans are no longer the only source of inventorship?10 Can human and AI 
compete within the same arena of patentability?11 Is there a line of demarcation 
where human and AI creativity should no longer be judged according to the 
same standards?12 
One AI machine, known as the Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping 
of Unified Sentience (DABUS), has provoked controversy in patent systems 
around the world.13 DABUS is the first AI machine to be named as an inventor 
on a patent application.14 Although this is the first time a patent application 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 399, 
401 (2017) (noting that modern AI technology prompts varied reactions among the public, ranging 
from awe at computers that are capable of beating humans at various games, to concern that AI will 
automate the jobs people rely on). Some prominent figures, including Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla 
and SpaceX, and world-renowned physicist Stephen Hawking, have warned that AI might bring about 
the end of human existence as we know it. Catherine Clifford, Hundreds of A.I. Experts Echo Elon 
Musk, Stephen Hawking in Call for a Ban on Killer Robots, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.cnbc.
com/2017/11/08/ai-experts-join-elon-musk-stephen-hawking-call-for-killer-robot-ban.html [https://
perma.cc/XYM5-FTBD]. 
 8 See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent 
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1083–86 (2016) (stating that AI machines have been creating patent-
worthy inventions “for at least twenty years,” and some have even been awarded patents); Ben Hat-
tenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 32, 34–35 (2015) (noting that AI machines are engaging in the types of activities that 
traditionally have required human creativity and ingenuity, such as generating inventions). 
 9 See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED INVENT-
ING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 105–07 (2009) (asserting that current patent doctrine 
does not consider the role that AI plays in developing new inventions, which could allow early 
adopters of AI technology to obtain a large number of undeserved patents before the system adjusts); 
Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 32 (stating that the use of AI in inventing “is on a collision 
course with our patent laws”); Daniel Pitchford, Is Protecting AI’s Intellectual Property a Step Too 
Far?, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielpitchford/2019/04/04/ip-and-ai-
oxymoron-or-huge-commercial-opportunity/#3c6e393ed580 [https://perma.cc/3UWZ-B5ED] (noting 
that intellectual property issues arise because machine learning systems can write code for themselves, 
possibly leading to more distance between innovation and the initial human involvement). 
 10 See infra Part IV (arguing that patent law’s obviousness doctrine is well-suited to address AI’s 
increasing role in the inventive process). 
 11 See infra Part IV (asserting that obviousness can accommodate both human and AI contribu-
tions to the inventive process). 
 12 See infra Part IV (reasoning that no such line is necessary, so long as the “person having ordi-
nary skill in the art” (PHOSITA) standard remains responsive to industry practices). 
 13 Martin Coulter, Patent Agencies Challenged to Accept AI Inventor, FIN. TIMES (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9c114014-b373-11e9-bec9-fdcab53d6959 [https://perma.cc/K2UF-7GG6]. 
 14 Jared Council, Can an AI System Be Given a Patent?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/can-an-ai-system-be-given-a-patent-11570801500 [https://perma.cc/R3K5-
1416 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1413 
specifically names an AI machine as the inventor, reports indicate that other AI 
machines have played integral roles in the development of patentable inven-
tions.15 On August 27, 2019, soon after DABUS’s patent applications were 
filed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published a notice seek-
ing input from the public regarding how patent law should approach this ex-
panding technology.16 
                                                                                                                           
HDGW]. The AI machine is credited as the inventor on two patent applications, one involving an 
interlocking food and beverage container and the other involving a signal light that flashes at frequen-
cies designed to trigger an increase in attentiveness in the human brain. Patent Applications, ARTIFI-
CIAL INVENTOR, http://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/ [https://perma.cc/8A55-QP83]. 
Stephen Thaler, the creator of the Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience’s 
(DABUS), filed patent applications before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Unit-
ed Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), and the European Patent Office (EPO). Id. Thaler 
reports that the machine developed the inventions without human assistance. Emma Woollacott, Eu-
ropean Patent Office Rejects World’s First AI Inventor, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/emmawoollacott/2020/01/03/european-patent-office-rejects-worlds-first-ai-inventor/?sh=
7542fe085cd0 [https://perma.cc/JEW4-P3EL]. All three agencies denied the patent application based on 
requirements that inventors must be human beings. Decision on Petition, U.S. Pat. Application No. 
16/524,350, at 3–8 (July 29, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
16524350_22apr2020_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3EF-FWLJ]; James Nurton, EPO and UKIPO Refuse 
AI-Invented Patent Applications, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/
01/07/epo-ukipo-refuse-ai-invented-patent-applications/id=117648/ [https://perma.cc/2R9B-4DYF]. 
Although DABUS’s patent application failed, the USPTO and commentators recognize that questions 
remain surrounding inventions created using AI. See COKE MORGAN STEWART, U.S. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE POLICY 6 (2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/20200507_PPAC_AI_Policy_Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWR3-ZJUX] (listing relevant 
policy questions, such as whether the use of AI in inventing should affect the PHOSITA standard); see 
also, e.g., Jason D. Krieser & Shawn C. Helms, USPTO: Artificial Intelligence Systems Cannot Legal-
ly Invent, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (May 8, 2020), https://www.mwe.com/insights/uspto-
artificial-intelligence-systems-cannot-legally-invent/ [https://perma.cc/A69S-8J3A] (stating that the 
USPTO “sidestepped” difficult policy issues related to the future of AI inventing and denied 
DABUS’s patent application based on existing law’s textual requirement that inventors be natural 
persons). 
 15 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 51–61 (describing inventions that have been created using AI, 
such as the Oral-B Cross Action toothbrush, a new electronic controller, a specialized antenna for use 
in space, and others); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer 
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1680 (1997) (noting that an 
AI machine created an “ultra-hard” substance used in construction). But see Daria Kim, ‘AI-
Generated’: Time to Get the Record Straight?, 69 GRUR INT’L 443, 445–46 (2020) (“Legal narra-
tives of AI-generated inventions often refer to almost the same set of examples: the Oral-B toothbrush 
and other accomplishment of the “Creativity Machine” designed by Stephen L. Thaler, the NASA 
antenna, achievements in the field of genetic programming reported by John Koza and AI applications 
in drugs discovery and development. More recently, the project “Artificial Inventor” presented several 
inventions attributed to the connectionist system DABUS: a method for constructing and simulating 
artificial neural networks, a food container, and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention. 
None of the reviewed legal sources, however, provide a technical explanation of how the computa-
tional process was set up.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
 16 Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,889 
(Aug. 27, 2019). The USPTO received dozens of submissions from both individuals and organiza-
tions. Notices on Artificial Intelligence, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.
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One issue raised in the notice was how AI inventions might implicate the 
“person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA) standard.17 Similar to the 
“reasonable person” standard in tort law, which represents the average person 
for everyday negligence, the PHOSITA standard represents the average skilled 
worker for the scientific discipline of the invention.18 Suppose the use of AI is 
commonplace within a given field of study—would this mean the PHOSITA 
has AI capabilities?19 Should patent offices require applicants to disclose the 
use of AI?20 Is the PHOSITA framework still effective when applied to inven-
tions created by AI, without significant human involvement?21 
This Note examines these and related questions as they pertain to one of 
the most important requirements for obtaining a patent: obviousness.22 To re-
ceive a patent, an invention must not be obvious to a PHOSITA at the time of 
the patent application.23 That is, it must be nonobvious.24 The nonobvious re-
quirement filters out inconsequential improvements that are undeserving of the 
robust rights provided by patents.25 Whether the average skilled worker would 
                                                                                                                           
uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence/notices-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/M2ED-
927W]. 
 17 Notices on Artificial Intelligence, supra note 16. 
 18 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04A[1] (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). The 
“reasonable person” is a conception employed in tort law to determine whether a defendant has com-
mitted negligence. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 
325 (2012). The test examines whether the defendant exercised the level of care that would be ex-
pected of a reasonable person acting under similar circumstances. Id. The purpose of using a standard 
based on this hypothetical person is that it measures the defendant’s conduct based on society’s expec-
tations, rather than on how any specific, actual person would have performed under the circumstances. 
Richard Mullender, The Reasonable Person, the Pursuit of Justice, and Negligence Law, 68 MOD. L. 
REV. 681, 681–82 (2005). 
 19 See infra Part IV (arguing that the PHOSITA standard should treat AI like any other tools and 
that, if inventors within an industry widely use AI, courts and the USPTO should expect that a PHOS-
ITA has used it). 
 20 See infra Part IV (explaining that requiring inventors to disclose the use of AI could confuse 
the obviousness analysis and could result in an inappropriately heightened PHOSITA standard with 
respect to inventions that are created using the aid of AI). 
 21 See infra Part IV (positing that unless or until AI exists with human-like intelligence, the 
PHOSITA standard can address issues of AI inventing adequately). 
 22 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2007) (describing obviousness as a “defining doctrine of invention” and “fundamental to the proper 
functioning of the patent system”). 
 23 Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious Confusion Over Properties Discovered After a Patent Application, 
43 AIPLA Q.J. 489, 491–92 (2015). This definition of obviousness applies to patents governed by the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which Congress enacted in 2011. Id. at 491. For patents 
governed by the Patent Act of 1952, the frame of reference focuses on the time of invention rather 
than the filing date of the patent application. Id. at 492. For further explanation of the changes brought 
forth by the AIA and an explanation of the process for determining whether the AIA or the Patent Act 
of 1952 applies in a given case, see infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 24 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 379 
(2008). 
 25 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950). 
1418 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1413 
find something nonobvious depends on the resources available.26 As the 
PHOSITA’s capabilities increase, inventions must demonstrate greater ingenui-
ty to show nonobviousness.27 
This Note rebuts scholarship that contends that the current obviousness 
doctrine is ill-equipped to handle technological advances in AI.28 Part I out-
lines the historical development of obviousness and the role that it plays in 
screening out inventions that do not deserve patents.29 Part II describes the ca-
pabilities of contemporary and potentially forthcoming AI machines.30 Part III 
discusses the implications of AI’s increasing contribution to the development 
of inventions.31 It also analyzes current scholarship, which surmises that the 
existing obviousness analysis is insufficient when it comes to AI.32 Part IV ar-
gues that the obviousness doctrine, in its current conception, is sufficient and 
necessary for addressing the expanding role that AI plays in inventing.33 It fur-
ther contends that recent proposals to modify obviousness to require that patent 
applicants disclose the use of AI or to replace the PHOSITA altogether, could 
distort the obviousness standard such that it rejects certain patent-worthy in-
ventions and awards patents to some obvious inventions.34 
I. THE PATENT INCENTIVE AND THE OBVIOUSNESS DOCTRINE 
Patents confer several rights on an inventor, including the right to exclude 
others from using patented technology.35 Although this limited monopoly is 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). 
 27 Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating 
that a highly skilled PHOSITA would look beyond the processes commonly known in the field and 
would apply related scientific disciplines to solve a problem). Such a sophisticated PHOSITA is much 
harder to impress than a less educated tradesperson who is skilled only in a specific task. Id. 
 28 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07 (asserting that the current application of the obviousness 
doctrine fails to consider the role that AI plays in augmenting research, which could lead to early users 
of AI technology obtaining patents for inventions that should have been found to be obvious); Ryan 
Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 34 (2019) (reasoning that when AI machines 
become ubiquitous within a given industry, the PHOSITA will become capable of invention, thus 
rendering everything obvious). Whether patent protections should apply to creations produced by AI 
machines is a matter of current debate. Compare Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 50 (reasoning 
that granting patents to AI inventors could provide social gain by incentivizing the further develop-
ment of inventive machines), with Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-
Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that AI-created inventions 
should not receive patent protection because AI systems do not require and would not respond to the 
incentives that patents provide). 
 29 See infra Part I. 
 30 See infra Part II. 
 31 See infra Part III. 
 32 See infra Part III. 
 33 See infra Part IV.A. 
 34 See infra Part IV.B; Part IV.C. 
 35 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
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justified as benefiting the public good by encouraging innovation,36 patents 
also can impose heavy costs on society by decreasing competition, reducing ac-
cess to necessary medical treatments, and impeding further innovation when pa-
tent holders refuse to license their technology to researchers.37 Nonetheless, in-
ventors are unlikely to invest significant time and resources into bringing new 
technologies to the market if they fear that they cannot recover their costs.38 Pa-
tents enable inventors to recover their costs by preventing competitors from 
manufacturing the same technology within the twenty-year patent term.39 
Without patent protection, competitors could reproduce the invention, which 
would drive down prices before inventors can recover their costs.40 
                                                                                                                           
importing the invention into the United States . . . .”). The term “patentee” refers to both the original 
recipient of the patent as well as those who later obtain ownership over the patent. Id. § 100(d). Pa-
tents are commonly conceptualized as property rights, except that patents only ever guarantee the right 
to exclude others from using the claimed invention. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 
§ 16.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011) (noting that patents only provide the right to exclude others and 
never “grant the affirmative right to make, use or sell” the invention); see also Impression Prods. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017) (explaining that the sale of an item, subject to a 
patent, extinguishes the right to exclude others from the use of that item, and thus the “patent rights 
yield to the common law [of property] principle against restraints on alienation”). But see Adam 
Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 325–26 (2009) 
(theorizing that the characterization of patents as simply a right to exclude, rather than a wholly dis-
tinct form of property, causes doctrinal disarray within patent law). 
 36 See Robert P. Merges, Symposium, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (stating that the overarching purpose of intellectual property pro-
tection is commonly portrayed as enhancing economic productivity by addressing market failures that 
stifle further innovation). Patents are most often justified on utilitarian theories, which find that the 
costs of patents are worth the benefits of incentivizing innovation. See David S. Olson, Taking the 
Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 n.1 (2009) (analyzing a series of patent law casebooks and finding that law 
students are consistently taught that the purpose of patent law is to advance innovation in line with 
utilitarian principles). The constitutional basis for patent law, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, exhibits 
utilitarian motivations by giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 37 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 303, 314 (2013) (noting the deadweight loss that patent monopolies cause by limiting compe-
tition); Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Internation-
al Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 201–02 (2005) (explaining 
that intellectual property protections on pharmaceuticals drive up prices, thereby impeding lower-
income individuals from accessing medical care); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37–38 (1991) (explaining 
that, in the absence of licensing agreements, patents can inhibit cumulative innovation). 
 38 Olson, supra note 36, at 183. 
 39 Id. at 192–93. 
 40 Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of 
Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 919–20 (2009); Olson, supra note 36, at 196. 
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The pharmaceutical industry provides a good example of this principle.41 
The average cost of developing a new drug is between two to three billion dol-
lars.42 Without the market exclusivity that is guaranteed by a patent, pharmaceu-
tical developers would have little incentive to expend these costs to bring new 
drugs to market.43 Patents step in to address this market failure by giving inven-
tors an opportunity to recoup their research and development costs in exchange 
for a public disclosure of their new invention.44 This is often described as a quid 
pro quo, through which an inventor is given a limited monopoly in exchange for 
developing new technology for society’s benefit.45 Patent law aims to provide 
only so much benefit as is necessary to incentivize innovation; anything beyond 
that can burden the market, resulting in more harm than good.46 
Section A of this Part discusses the economic and social considerations 
guiding the obviousness doctrine.47 Section B details the modern nonobvious-
ness requirement that inventions must meet to qualify for patent protection.48 
A. The Obviousness Doctrine’s Role in Patent Law 
Several patentability requirements exist to screen out inventions unde-
serving of protection.49 To qualify for a patent, an invention must concern pa-
tentable subject matter,50 and it must be new,51 useful,52 and nonobvious.53 Of 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of 
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1038 (1998). 
 42 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D 
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016). 
 43 Hearing on Intellectual Property and the Price of Prescription Drugs: Balancing Innovation 
and Competition Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2019) (written submission of 
David S. Olson). 
 44 Olson, supra note 36, at 196–97. 
 45 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (describing patent rights as a quid pro quo in 
which the inventor is given a monopoly on the patented invention in exchange for bettering society by 
bringing a beneficial technology to the market). The quid pro quo analogy, however, is not without its 
critics. See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor 
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1345–46, 1388 (2004) (discrediting the quid pro quo 
theory of patent law for oversimplifying market actors’ behavior into a binary choice between “inno-
vation” or “imitation” and for failing to capture patent law’s many regulatory goals). 
 46 Olson, supra note 36, at 183. 
 47 See infra Part I.A. 
 48 See infra Part I.B. 
 49 See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217, 
1224–26 (2017) (explaining that patentability requirements signal to innovators that meritorious in-
ventions will be protected, and also serve to limit negative effects on society by denying protections to 
undeserving patent applications). 
 50 35 U.S.C. § 101. The patentable subject matter requirement stems from 35 U.S.C. § 101, which 
states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
requirement as disallowing the issuance of patents on “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). No matter how novel, useful, or nonobvi-
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ous an invention may be, the inventor cannot lay claim to non-patentable subject matter. See Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32 (1948) (invalidating a patent for a com-
bination of noninhibiting bacteria strains that the inventor discovered could be used together without 
diminishing the effects of any one of the strains). In 1948, in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., the Supreme Court held that, although an inventor’s discovery allowed farmers to use a single 
inoculant for multiple crops rather than “buy[ing] six different packages for six different crops,” the 
discovery concerned a natural phenomenon and therefore could not be patented. Id. Scholars and 
courts widely cite Funk Bros. Seed Co. as an early application of the patentable subject matter re-
quirement, including a recent Supreme Court decision regarding the patentability of DNA. See Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013) (invalidating patent 
claims on certain DNA segments that indicate that a patient has an increased risk of breast cancer, and 
citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. to emphasize that “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discov-
ery does not by itself satisfy the [patentable subject matter] inquiry”). But see Shine Tu, Funk Broth-
ers—An Exercise in Obviousness, 80 UMKC L. REV. 637, 637 (2012) (arguing that Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. concerns obviousness rather than patentable subject matter, and asserting that novelty and obvi-
ousness are better equipped for addressing the issue of whether patents should be granted on genes). 
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence allows patents relating to non-patentable subject matter when 
there is a showing of separate, inventive enterprise. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591–
95 (invalidating patent claims on DNA segments but upholding claims on cDNA because cDNA is 
created in laboratory settings and is therefore not a natural product). 
 51 35 U.S.C. § 102. The novelty requirement disallows patents on inventions that cannot show a 
meaningful difference from a single example of “prior art.” 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PA-
TENTS § 3.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011); see infra note 69 and accompanying text (describing prior 
art). Novelty differs from obviousness in that novelty looks to singular prior art references to deter-
mine whether a claimed invention is new, whereas obviousness combines multiple prior art references 
to discern whether the references, evaluated together, would have rendered the claimed invention 
obvious to a PHOSITA. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 424–25 (2007) (invalidating 
a patent on an invention that combined multiple prior art references to create a novel but nonetheless 
obvious improvement). 
 52 35 U.S.C. § 101. Utility stems from 35 U.S.C. § 101, which courts have interpreted as requiring 
that an invention show some “specific” and “substantial” societal benefit in its current form. Id.; 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). Thus, “‘throw-away,’ ‘insubstantial,’ or ‘nonspe-
cific’ utilities, such as the use of a complex invention as landfill, [will not] satisfy[] the utility re-
quirement . . . .” Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). Although 
mechanical devices typically meet this requirement, this condition can pose a challenging obstacle for 
inventions concerning chemical compositions. 1 CHISUM, supra note 51, § 4.02; see In re Fisher, 421 
F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating a patent for lack of specific and substantial utility be-
cause the claimed chemical compounds were merely “research intermediates” for which the inventor 
could show no “real world benefit”). Utility also requires some showing that an invention is not “inju-
rious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.” Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 
1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). This requirement, however, “has not been applied broadly in 
recent years.” See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(upholding the utility of a patent, which was arguably deceitful, in that it displayed a colorful liquid 
atop a beverage dispenser, though the drink customers actually received was combined at the time of 
order with water and syrup concentrate hidden below the dispenser). 
 53 35 U.S.C. § 103; see Cameron T. Ellis, The Four Horsemen of Patentability—An Empirical 
Study of Patentability Requirement Reversal Rates in the Federal Circuit, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
28, 32–37 (2018) (describing patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and other patentabil-
ity requirements, and stating that it is established doctrine that inventions must be new, useful, and 
nonobvious to qualify for a patent). 
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these requirements, obviousness is one of the most commonly litigated is-
sues.54 Thus, it performs a critical role in ensuring that patents are issued only 
for those inventions whose benefits to society outweigh the costs that patents 
impose.55 The obviousness doctrine does this by screening out inventions that 
exhibit only minor technological advances, reserving patent protection only for 
those inventions that meaningfully advance the field of study.56 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Pa-
tents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208–09 (1998) (finding that obviousness was the most commonly litigated 
patentability requirement). A 2014 update found that, although other issues of patentability had been 
raised more frequently than in the previous study, obviousness remained one of the most commonly 
litigated issues. John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1785 (2014); see also Christopher C. Kennedy, Rethinking Obviousness, 2015 
WIS. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (“More judicial ink likely has been spilt on the topic of obviousness than on 
any other topic in patent law.”); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 
APLA Q.J. 26, 26 (1972) (describing the nonobviousness requirement as “the heart of the patent sys-
tem and the justification of patent grants”). 
 55 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950). 
 56 KSR, 550 U.S. at 427. The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the nonobviousness 
requirement is to disallow patents on inventions that inventors would have developed and provided to 
the public, even if they did not expect to receive a patent for their efforts. Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966). If the USPTO provides patents only for inventions that would otherwise be 
unavailable to the market—because the inventors would not have felt comfortable expending the nec-
essary research and development without the promise of a patent—then the public will experience no 
negative effects from the limited monopoly that patents provide. Michael Abramowicz & John F. 
Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1598 (2011). The economic 
burdens associated with the patent monopoly, however, would not actually occur because, if not for 
the patent, the technology would not exist in the first place. Id. This principle has come to be known 
as the “inducement standard” of nonobviousness, and it posits that patents should be granted only on 
inventions that would not have occurred but for the inducement of the patent. Id. at 1599–60. Alt-
hough widely accepted as a guiding touchstone, this standard is regarded by many as too theoretical 
and unwieldy to elucidate actual doctrine. See Gregory Mandel, The Non-obvious Problem: How the 
Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
57, 86–87 (2008) (reasoning that even if empirical evidence existed concerning the appropriate in-
ducement necessary for inventions, a strictly applied inducement standard would still pose problems, 
such as allowing patents on trivial inventions that would not have occurred absent the inducement of a 
patent); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301–02 (reasoning that, because of the empirical difficulties involved in determining 
the necessary inducement for a given invention, the nonobviousness inquiry can only make an “awk-
ward” attempt to accommodate the inducement standard); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVA-
TION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 11 (2003), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-
and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVB9-V6GK] (finding the inducement 
standard useful “for conceptual purposes” but not sufficiently administrable “in most individual cas-
es”). Critics reason that it is usually difficult to discern the point at which an invention would not have 
occurred absent the incentive provided by patents. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 416 (2001). Further, there is often value in inducing earlier inven-
tions even if they would eventually occur without the patent incentive. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra, 
at 1598. Although the inducement standard serves as an instructive principle, patent applicants are not 
required to show that the claimed invention would not have occurred but for the patent inducement. 
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, at 11 (noting that the inducement standard is difficult to apply and 
thus “the more manageable standards of the patent statute” have arisen in its stead). 
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Developing a rule to determine whether a given invention represents a 
substantial innovation or is merely a minor improvement is a difficult task.57 
As Judge Learned Hand once lamented, the standard required for identifying 
inventions worthy of patenting “is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and 
vague a phantom as exits [sic] in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.”58 
All improvements represent at least some level of advancement over prior 
technology.59 Thus, courts and patent offices must compare an invention to 
existing technologies to determine whether the invention is enough of an ad-
vancement that it deserves a patent.60 The wide range of industries and fields 
of study from which inventions arise further complicates the issue of obvious-
ness.61 In its attempt to address these issues, obviousness has undergone a 
number of changes.62 Understanding its current application requires a review 
of the standard’s historical development and the past attempts to clarify the 
doctrine, which have led to its current state.63 
B. The Test for Nonobviousness: A Historical Overview 
In 1851, the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood first articulated 
what Congress would later enact as the nonobviousness requirement.64 In that 
case, an inventor modified existing door and furniture handle designs by ex-
changing the wood and metal knobs with other known material, including pot-
tery clay and porcelain knobs.65 The Court determined that the inventor’s im-
provement, although exhibiting the skill of an experienced worker, did not rep-
resent a significant advancement.66 The Court held that an invention is not enti-
tled to a patent unless it demonstrates an innovation beyond that which would 
be expected from an ordinary technician proficient in the industry.67 Congress 
later codified the Hotchkiss doctrine in § 103 of the U.S. Patent Act of 1952, 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 266–67 (1851) (describing multiple in-
stances in which workers developed improvements over prior art that enabled cheaper production and 
superior products, but nonetheless failed to evidence enough of an advance to be deserving of a pa-
tent). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155–56 (2002) (discussing the challenges involved in applying patent law standards 
across many different fields and emerging technologies). 
 62 See generally Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 
118–30 (2019) (providing a thorough account of obviousness’s historical development). 
 63 See id. (detailing Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s modifications to the obviousness doc-
trine, which addressed various issues that arose over time). 
 64 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267. 
 65 Id. at 264–65. 
 66 Id. at 267. 
 67 Id. 
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officially establishing the nonobviousness standard for all patent applications.68 
Congress reaffirmed the test in § 103 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA), enacted in 2011 and set out below: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the dif-
ferences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such 
that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed in-
vention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in 
which the invention was made.69 
Section 103 does not detail how to determine the relevant “prior art,” de-
fine the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” nor how to decide if the in-
vention would have been “obvious.”70 In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 
the Supreme Court interpreted § 103 and laid out the modern nonobviousness 
test.71 The Court held that nonobviousness is a question of law based on sever-
al findings of fact, including: (1) “the scope and content of the prior art”; (2) 
the dissimilarities between the invention and the prior art; (3) the standard of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) “secondary considerations,” such as 
whether the invention enjoys market success, addresses lingering but unre-
                                                                                                                           
 68 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 100, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 35 U.S.C.); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 69 35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added). The AIA sought to synchronize the U.S. patent system with 
the rest of the world by transitioning from the 1952 Act’s “first-to-invent” system to a largely “first-
to-file” system. Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1023, 1046 (2012). The old first-to-invent system allowed inventors to “swear[] behind” an otherwise 
invalidating prior art reference. Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance 
of the Invention Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 67 (2009). 
Thus, inventors who filed patent applications for inventions that already had been disclosed in the 
prior art could still obtain a patent by showing that they already had conceived of the invention at the 
time of the prior art disclosure. Id. at 68. Assuming the inventor exercised reasonable diligence in 
reducing the invention to practice, the prior art disclosure would not disqualify the patent—hence the 
term “first-to-invent.” Id. at 67–68. The AIA eliminated the first-to-invent system by making the ef-
fective filing date, rather than the date of invention, the critical date for determining whether the prior 
art had invalidated the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (2). The AIA also affected what constitutes “pri-
or art.” Id. Under the 1952 Act, prior art consisted of “patent[s]” and “printed publications” existing 
anywhere in the world, and any instance in which the invention was “in public use or on sale” within 
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (2) (1952). The AIA removed the geographic restrictions for 
prior use and sale; thus, for patent applications with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 
2013—the date on which the AIA took effect—any prior patents, printed publications, uses, and sales 
qualify as prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (2) (2018) (providing no geographic qualifications for 
what constitutes prior art). For patents operating under the 1952 Act, prior art consists of references 
existing at the time of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952). The AIA, on the other hand, considers 
prior art to be those references existing at the time of the effective filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
 70 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (mentioning the terms: “prior art,” “person having ordinary skill in the 
art,” and “obviousness,” but not defining them). 
 71 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
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solved issues, or succeeds where others have failed.72 Based on these four fac-
tual findings, a legal determination is made whether a PHOSITA would find 
the invention obvious.73 The following Subsections further explore this test.74 
1. Scope and Content of the Prior Art: The Analogous Requirement 
Because courts evaluate obviousness based on an invention’s improve-
ment over preexisting technology, the first step is to identify all relevant prior 
art.75 Prior art refers to all information, knowledge, technologies, or products 
available to the public prior to a patent’s effective filing date.76 Typically, the 
more prior art an invention is evaluated against, the more likely a court apply-
ing the PHOSITA standard will find it obvious.77 Although § 103 does not ex-
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. Secondary considerations are meant to serve as objective indicators of an invention’s inge-
nuity. Jonathan J. Darrow, Secondary Considerations: A Structured Framework for Patent Analysis, 
74 ALB. L. REV. 47, 49 (2010). In Graham, the Supreme Court provided several examples of second-
ary considerations, including “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of oth-
ers . . . .” 383 U.S. at 17. The commercial success of an invention tends to demonstrate its ingenuity 
because, all other things equal, consumers likely would not seek out products possessing the claimed 
invention if those products were not superior to other designs. Darrow, supra, at 49–50. Likewise, an 
invention addressing long-felt needs or succeeding where past attempts have failed tends to show that 
it is not obvious because, if it were, those past attempts likely would have succeeded. Id. at 49. Alt-
hough, in 1966, the Graham Court held that secondary considerations “might be utilized to give light 
to the circumstances,” the Federal Circuit has since held that secondary considerations must be con-
sidered. 383 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added); see Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that secondary consid-
erations must be evaluated in an obviousness determination, and stating that the lower court erred by 
failing to do so), rev’d, 699 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141 (9th ed. Rev. Oct. 2019) [hereinafter MPEP] 
(requiring USPTO examiners to consider the secondary characteristics provided in patent applica-
tions). Courts have looked to additional secondary considerations, such as: (1) the willingness of 
competitors to obtain licenses from the patent holder; (2) the praise from professionals within the field 
advanced by the invention; and (3) infringers’ imitations of the patent. 2 CHISUM, supra note 18, 
§ 5.05[3–5]. When applying these factors, courts look to whether a nexus exists between the second-
ary factor and the ingenuity of the invention. Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 
F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For example, a showing that an invention’s commercial success is 
unrelated to marketing or preexisting brand recognition will tend to show a nexus between the inven-
tion’s ingenuity and its demand within the market. Id.  
 73 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
 74 See infra Part I.B.1–4. 
 75 In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 76 35 U.S.C. § 102. This definition assumes application of the AIA. Id. For technical definitions 
of prior art for patents operating under both pre- and post-AIA rules, see supra note 69 and accompa-
nying text. 
 77 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (providing that obviousness is determined based on “the differences be-
tween the claimed invention and the prior art” (emphasis added)); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior 
Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 123, 127 (2018) (stating that obviousness is “relative” 
in that it “requires a comparison between the invention as claimed in the patent and the ‘prior art’”). 
Considering fewer prior art references tends to make these differences appear greater and, thus, the 
invention less obvious. See Jeffrey T. Burgess, The Analogous Art Test, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
63, 79 (2009) (stating that for every reference that is part of the relevant prior art, “a patent practition-
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plicitly outline the scope of prior art that should be considered, it provides that 
obviousness should be evaluated according to “the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains.”78 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
interpreted this to mean that only prior art that is “analogous” to the claimed 
invention should be considered.79 The Federal Circuit is the primary court of 
review for all patent disputes.80 Unlike other circuit courts, whose jurisdiction 
is based on geography, the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction over 
patent issues.81 
In 1986, in In re Deminski, the Federal Circuit adopted a two-part test for 
defining the scope of analogous prior art.82 First, courts consider whether prior 
art is within the same “field of . . . endeavor” as the claimed invention.83 If it 
is, the prior art is deemed analogous.84 Prior art within the same field of en-
deavor as the claimed invention is analogous, even if it has never been used to 
address the problem solved by the claimed invention.85 Typically, the field of 
endeavor does not encompass the entire scientific discipline or industry.86 Ra-
ther, it is narrowly constrained to an invention’s “embodiments, function, and 
structure” as described in the patent application.87 For example, the Federal 
                                                                                                                           
er must enter the minefield of accurately portraying the differences between the reference and the 
invention”). 
 78 35 U.S.C. § 103. Both the USPTO and courts play a role in evaluating patents. 6A DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). To obtain a patent, inventors 
must submit a patent application to the USPTO. 1 CHISUM, supra note 50, § 1. The USPTO assigns 
each patent application to one of its patent examiners who evaluates the application and determines 
whether to grant a patent based on various statutory requirements. Id. Inventors who successfully 
complete this process and receive a patent may then sue those who infringe upon the patent. Id. Al-
leged infringers can defend themselves by asserting noninfringement—meaning that the patent’s 
claims do not apply to their use of a given technology—or by claiming that the patent is invalid. 6A 
CHISUM, supra, § 19.02. To argue that a patent is invalid, one essentially must make the case that the 
patent examiner made a mistake in granting the patent because the invention fails an essential re-
quirement, such as novelty, utility, or nonobviousness. Id. Even if a defendant has infringed upon the 
patent at issue, the individual could escape liability by proving that the patent is invalid. Id. 
 79 Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1895). The analogous art doctrine stems from an 1895 
Supreme Court decision concerning an invention for crushing clay into fine pieces that was very simi-
lar to a preexisting apparatus used for polishing wood. Id. at 600–01. In spite of the similarities be-
tween the inventions, the Court upheld the patent, holding that, in order to invalidate a patent, prior art 
must be used in a way that is so analogous to the claimed invention that a mechanic of ordinary skill 
would have thought to apply it. Id. at 608. 
 80 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
 81 Id.; Jason Rantanen, The Landscape of Modern Patent Appeals, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 985, 990–
91 (2018). 
 82 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that the claimed invention did not 
share the same field of endeavor as an instance of prior art “merely because both relate[d] to the petro-
leum industry”). 
 87 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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Circuit has distinguished surgical instruments employing ultrasonic energy 
from surgical instruments that do not as separate fields of endeavor.88 
Prior art that is not in the same field of endeavor can still be analogous if 
it reasonably pertains to the obstacle that the new invention overcomes.89 This 
includes all prior art that an inventor would naturally consult for inspiration 
when attempting to address a similar issue.90 For example, the Federal Circuit 
has held that prior art involving a bed that folds into the wall was reasonably 
pertinent to a treadmill with a folding base.91 Once a court has identified all 
analogous art, it then imputes this knowledge to the hypothetical PHOSITA.92 
Having determined what a PHOSITA would know, the next Subsection de-
scribes how courts identify the PHOSITA’s level of skill.93 
2. Identifying the PHOSITA 
The nonobviousness test hinges on whether a PHOSITA, knowing all the 
relevant prior art and seeking to solve the same problem, would have thought 
to create the claimed invention.94 The PHOSITA is not an actual person work-
ing within the same field as the invention, but rather a legal fiction created to 
conceptualize the ingenuity exhibited by a claimed invention over preexisting 
technology.95 The PHOSITA is a strange creature, comprehending the entire 
world of relevant prior art (a potentially superhuman feat depending on the 
scope of the prior art), while having only ordinary skill and creativity in how it 
solves the problem addressed by the claimed invention.96 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
The Federal Circuit also has distinguished the extraction of crude petroleum from the storage of re-
fined petroleum derivatives as separate fields of endeavor. In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. But see In re 
Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325–27 (holding that a preexisting toothbrush design was within the same field of 
endeavor as a hairbrush for which the inventor sought a patent). The result in In re Bigio was likely 
due to the simplicity of the technology involved in the dispute. See Burgess, supra note 77, at 73 (stat-
ing that the field of endeavor tends to expand when the claimed invention is simple and accordingly 
contract when the invention is complicated). 
 89 In re Deminski, 796 F.2d at 442. 
 90 In re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 91 Id. at 1377, 1380. Although the court held that the bed was outside the treadmill’s field of en-
deavor, it determined that the inventive mechanism “generally addresse[d] problems of supporting the 
weight of such a mechanism and providing a stable resting position.” Id. at 1380. 
 92 Burgess, supra note 77, at 68–69. 
 93 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 94 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 95 2 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 5.04A[1]. 
 96 See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 14–
15 (1992) (conceptualizing the PHOSITA as a “roomful” of skilled workers); Jonathan J. Darrow, 
Note, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 
235 (2009) (describing the PHOSITA as an imagined person whose characteristics reflect the needs of 
the patent system as opposed to traits that could be attributed to an actual human being); Joseph P. 
Meara, Comment, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious 
Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 293 (2002) (reasoning that in some fields the interdisciplinary 
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Given the PHOSITA standard, the nonobviousness requirement is a high 
bar to meet.97 Because many inventions that appear inventive are, in reality, 
obvious when evaluated against a PHOSITA with such omniscient knowledge 
of all relevant prior art, the standard is difficult to overcome.98 Although the 
breadth of information that the PHOSITA possesses may seem too lofty a 
standard to meet, the standard is well-founded.99 Although no one expects in-
ventors to possess an all-encompassing knowledge of the prior art, this standard 
is necessary to ensure that only significant advancements are awarded patents.100 
If an invention cannot show nonobviousness when compared to all prior art 
within the same field of endeavor or reasonably pertinent to the problem solved 
by the claimed invention, then it is not a significant advancement.101 
Given that the PHOSITA has such extraordinary knowledge of the rele-
vant prior art, the level of skill attributed to the PHOSITA is critical.102 The 
Federal Circuit has specified a number of factors to determine the PHOSITA’s 
level of skill, including: (1) the sorts of issues common to the field of study, (2) 
the solutions to those issues that exist within the prior art, (3) the frequency 
with which improvements occur, (4) the complexity and refinement of the 
technology involved, and (5) the extent of schooling obtained by technicians 
currently working in the field.103 
The Federal Circuit also has listed the inventor’s education level as a 
sixth factor in a number of cases.104 Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has 
placed less weight on this factor, employing it cautiously and only when there 
                                                                                                                           
nature of discovery is such that the PHOSITA is best thought of as a team of workers, each skilled in 
the appropriate field). 
 97 Jasper L. Tran, Timing Matters: Prior Art’s Age Infers Patent Nonovbiousness, 50 GONZ. L. 
REV. 189, 193 (2014). 
 98 2 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 5.04A[1][b]. 
 99 See id. (stating that, by holding inventors accountable for such a broad array of prior art, the 
obviousness doctrine encourages inventors not to reinvent the wheel, but rather to examine the prior 
art before attempting to invent a new solution). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) (stating that granting a patent for “every 
slight advance made . . . is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences”). But see Daralyn J. 
Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 989, 1015–17 (2008) (arguing for a more realistic conception of the PHOSITA that better 
approximates what an actual skilled worker would be expected to know). 
 102 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1191–92 (noting the disparities in the level of skill 
attributed to the PHOSITA across various industries, and arguing that such disparities lead to incon-
sistent results). 
 103 In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In a given case, the court need not 
apply all factors and may choose to emphasize some factors over others. Id. 
 104 See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (list-
ing “the educational level of the inventor” as a factor for determining the PHOSITA’s skill in the art), 
rev’d, 781 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Env’t Designs, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (same). 
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is reason to believe that it is especially illuminating in a particular case.105 The 
Federal Circuit and multiple commentators recognize the danger of applying 
this factor which, unlike the others, focuses on the actual inventor’s capabili-
ties rather than those possessed by average workers in the field.106 The PHOS-
ITA is not meant to represent the actual inventor, but rather is a fictional repre-
sentation of the average level of skill within the industry.107 The current 
USPTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) omits the education 
level of the inventor from its factors for finding PHOSITA.108 
3. Final Determination of Obviousness 
After identifying the scope and content of the prior art, and completing all 
other factual inquiries, courts must put all this information together to deter-
mine whether the claimed invention would have been obvious to a PHOSI-
TA.109 Due to the difficult factual underpinnings in place, courts still struggle 
with this final determination.110 After all, judges typically do not possess tech-
nical training in the field of study that the invention claims to advance.111 Fur-
ther, it is hard to resist engaging in hindsight bias when determining the obvi-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See In re Coutts, 726 F. App’x 791, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reasoning that, although an inven-
tor’s education level is relevant in some circumstances—such as when an inventor’s knowledge is 
especially indicative of the knowledge held by the average worker in the field—courts are generally 
wary of this type of inquiry because actual inventors differ in education level, ranging anywhere 
“‘from ignorant geniuses to Nobel laureates’” (quoting Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson 
& Pers. Prods. Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984))). 
 106 In re Coutts, 726 F. App’x at 796; Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1453; Nicholas J. Gingo, Dumb Inventors Rejoice: How 
Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex Violated the Federal Patent Statute, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 81, 98–99 
(2008); Mandel, supra note 56, at 73; Meara, supra note 96, at 279. 
 107 See Meara, supra note 96, at 279 (noting that taking the inventor’s education level into con-
sideration does not conform with conventional obviousness ideology, which forbids identifying the 
PHOSITA based on the knowledge and skill possessed by the actual inventor). 
 108 See MPEP, supra note 72, § 2141.03 (listing the five other factors for determining PHOSITA, 
but not mentioning the education level of the actual inventor).  
 109 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007). Contra Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 885, 888 (2004) (arguing that, although the PHOSITA provides guidance on the scope of prior 
art, the PHOSITA “sits on the sidelines” while courts make the final obviousness determination). 
 110 See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 62, at 165–67 (noting the disparities in how frequently 
various district courts and the Federal Circuit invalidate patents on obviousness grounds, and the poli-
cies and rationales that they rely on to do so). 
 111 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 61, at 1196 (“Judges generally don’t have any scientific back-
ground and, at the district court level at least, most law clerks don’t either.”); Doug Lichtman & Mark 
A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 67 (2007) (“Dis-
trict court judges are poorly equipped to read patent documents and construe technical patent 
claims.”). Even on the Federal Circuit, which hears all patent appeals, only “nine out of thirty-eight, or 
less than one-fourth of the judges who have ever sat upon the Federal Circuit [have] technical back-
grounds.” Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 809 n.48 (2016). 
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ousness of an invention after the inventor already has disclosed it.112 Much like 
hearing the answer before the riddle, it can be very difficult to place one’s self 
in the shoes of a PHOSITA facing the problem anew after the invention has 
already provided the solution.113 
In 1984, in ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, the Federal 
Circuit introduced a bright line rule for determining obviousness known as the 
“teaching, suggestion, and motivation” (TSM) test.114 Concerned about the 
effect of hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit devised the test to guard against 
instances in which a court, looking back in time, may underestimate the inge-
nuity of an invention.115 As originally conceived, the TSM test required that 
inventions formed by combining knowledge from two or more inventions in 
the prior art could only be found obvious if the prior art also provided a teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation for doing so.116 For example, the Federal Circuit 
applied the TSM test to overturn an obviousness determination for a video dis-
play system that combined two prior art systems: (1) a television with menu 
options for adjusting audio/visual settings, and (2) a video game providing a 
tutorial on how to play the game.117 Although both the patent examiner and the 
USPTO Board of Appeals determined that a PHOSITA would have found the 
combination obvious, the Federal Circuit vacated this finding because the prior 
art did not explicitly teach, suggest, or provide a motivation for such combina-
tion.118 
In 2006, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court re-
jected the Federal Circuit’s strict application of the TSM test in favor of a more 
flexible application of the test laid out in Graham.119 Although the TSM test is 
still consulted for guidance, it is only an instructive factor for finding obvious-
ness and is not automatically determinative.120 In KSR, the Court highlighted the 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias 
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1443 (2006). 
 113 Id. 
 114 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So 
Obvious After All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 
47 GA. L. REV. 41, 63–64 (2012). 
 115 In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 116 ACS Hosp. Sys., 732 F.2d at 1577. 
 117 In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1340–41, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 118 Id. at 1341, 1344. 
 119 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
 120 Id. at 418–19. The USPTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides a list of 
factors that may support a determination of obviousness, which includes the Federal Circuit’s TSM 
rationale: 
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable re-
sults; (B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable 
results; (C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) 
in the same way; (D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or prod-
uct) ready for improvement to yield predictable results; (E) “Obvious to try”—choosing 
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importance of utilizing a flexible test that could adapt to the specific technology 
involved.121 The Court also provided that “design incentives and other market 
forces” can clue a PHOSITA into modifying existing technology to solve prob-
lems.122 Thus, a PHOSITA is not always confined to the day-to-day knowledge 
of the art, but can also look to happenings in the market for guidance.123 
This revelation, coupled with the Court’s statement that the PHOSITA is 
“a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” appears to endow the 
PHOSITA with some measure of innovative potential.124 Prior to this decision, 
the Federal Circuit had treated the PHOSITA as an unimaginative worker de-
void of anything resembling creativity.125 Now, however, the PHOSITA has 
both ordinary skill and creativity, and can look to things outside the day-to-day 
happenings to the relevant “design incentives and other market forces.”126 This 
raises the obviousness bar that inventions must overcome, in that fewer inven-
tions will appear nonobvious as the PHOSITA grows more sophisticated.127 
4. The Manner of Invention 
To better understand the final sentence of § 103, which provides that pa-
tentability does not depend on “the manner in which the invention was made,” 
                                                                                                                           
from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation 
of success; (F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for 
use in either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other market 
forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art; (G) Some 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary 
skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to ar-
rive at the claimed invention. 
MPEP, supra note 72, § 2141 (emphasis added). The MPEP is not binding legal authority; rather, it is 
a set of USPTO instructions that examiners rely on when evaluating patent applications. In re Fisher, 
421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MPEP, supra note 72, at Foreword. 
 121 550 U.S. at 419. 
 122 Id. at 417. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 421; see Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 
249–50 (2008) (reasoning that the KSR Court’s decision changed the PHOSITA from an unimagina-
tive “dullard” into a craftsperson capable of combining existing technologies to overcome routine 
issues); Darrow, supra note 96, at 228 (arguing that KSR attributes to the PHOSITA an ability to 
search for new methods and designs in order to solve a problem); see also John H. Barton, Non-
obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 496 (2003) (describing the Federal Circuit’s conception of PHOSITA, 
prior to KSR, as a minimally competent and unimaginative worker, and suggesting that the PHOSITA 
should be equipped with the skill, resources, and aid that is typical of workers within the field). 
 125 Miller, supra note 124, at 249–50. 
 126 KSR, 550 U.S. at 417, 421. 
 127 See Miller, supra note 124, at 249–50 (describing how KSR elevated the capabilities of the 
PHOSITA beyond the Federal Circuit’s prior conceptions, which in turn enabled the PHOSITA to 
piece together information contained in prior art to create routine improvements). 
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it is useful to examine the now discarded “flash of genius” test.128 In 1941, in 
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., the Supreme Court held 
that patents must demonstrate a “flash of creative genius, not merely the skill 
of the calling.”129 Some courts interpreted this “flash of creative genius” to 
mean that nonobviousness requires a showing of sudden brilliance (an “ah-
ha!” moment) rather than the sustained research and experimentation involved 
in many inventions.130 This became known as the flash of genius test and was 
widely criticized for being difficult to apply and improperly directed at the 
mental faculties of the inventor, rather than the merits of the invention itself.131 
These and other concerns prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to initiate 
the National Patent Planning Commission in 1941 to evaluate the American 
patent system and determine how it could be improved.132 The committee 
called on Congress to develop a test for evaluating the objective merits of the 
invention itself, rather than the subjective considerations of how it was devel-
oped.133 Congress responded by enacting the U.S. Patent Act of 1952, which 
provided that patentability would not depend on “the manner in which the in-
vention was made.”134 In 1966, in Graham, the Supreme Court interpreted this 
language as expressly disavowing the flash of genius test.135 
Congress’s most recent pronouncement on obviousness, the Leahy-Smith 
AIA, enacted in 2011, carried over this language from the 1952 Patent Act, thus 
                                                                                                                           
 128 35 U.S.C. § 103; see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (stating that Congress 
included the final sentence of § 103 as an express repudiation of the flash of genius test). 
 129 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 130 See Aram Boyajian, The Flash of Creative Genius—An Alternative Interpretation, 25 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 776, 776–78 (1943) (detailing how various lower courts have interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s language in Cuno Engineering as requiring a “flash of creative genius”); Comment, The Flash 
of Genius Standard of Patentable Invention, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 86–87 (1944) (detailing a num-
ber of Second Circuit decisions in which the court invalidated patents because the inventors could not 
show a flash of genius); see also Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir.1942) 
(invalidating a patent on an engine lubricating and cooling system because it was the product of slow, 
grinding advancement rather than sudden discovery). Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand held: “Unless we are to mistake for invention the slow but inevi-
table progress of an industry through trial and error, and confer a monopoly merely upon the exercise 
of persistent and intelligent search for improvement, there was no invention in this.” Picard, 128 F.2d 
at 636. 
 131 See Otto Raymond Barnett, The “Flash of Genius” Fallacy, 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 785, 785–
86 (1943) (arguing that the flash of genius test fails to consider that many inventions arise out of rig-
orous experimentation); Comment, supra note 130, at 88 (arguing that the flash of genius test looks to 
subjective considerations of the inventor’s mental capabilities rather than objectively evaluating the 
invention itself). 
 132 William Jarratt, U.S. National Patent Planning Commission, 153 NATURE 12, 12 (1944). 
 133 NAT’L PAT. PLANNING COMM’N, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE NATION-
AL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, reprinted in 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 455, 462–63 (1943). 
 134 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). 
 135 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966). The Court explained that its prior language had been misunderstood, 
and that it never intended to make the inventor’s state of mind an issue of obviousness. Id. at 15 n.7. 
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reaffirming that obviousness should focus on a claimed invention’s contributions 
to the field of study rather than focusing on how the invention was developed.136 
II. THE ROLE OF AI IN INNOVATION 
Modern AI excels at specific, precisely defined tasks, but is incapable of 
the type of generalized understanding that would allow a single AI system to 
take the skills it learns in one area and apply them to a completely different 
cognitive endeavor.137 Nevertheless, AI machines often perform narrow tasks 
far better than any human can.138 
This highlights one of the many differences between human and machine 
intelligence.139 Humans possess broadly applicable, generalized intelligence, 
but process data slowly.140 In contrast, AI machines process data incredibly 
fast, but require extensive training using meticulously compiled datasets to 
perform new functions.141 Even after mastering a skill, AI machines are inca-
pable of taking what they have learned and applying it to learn a separate 
skill.142 This Part describes AI and its limitations, and details how some of the 
most promising forms of AI technology operate.143 
The term “artificial intelligence” has no universally accepted definition.144 
It is an umbrella term referring to computer programs designed to perform 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018) (“Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the 
invention was made.”). 
 137 Calo, supra note 7, at 405. 
 138 Tannya D. Jajal, Distinguishing Between Narrow AI, General AI and Super AI, MEDIUM (May 
21, 2018), https://medium.com/@tjajal/distinguishing-between-narrow-ai-general-ai-and-super-ai-a4
bc44172e22 [https://perma.cc/35PG-7JRX]. 
 139 See José Mira Mira, Symbols Versus Connections: 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence, 71 NEU-
ROCOMPUTING 671, 677 (2008) (“It is so obvious that human nature is distinct from the nature of the 
computer and the robot that comparative analysis almost seems unnecessary.”). 
 140 Ben Dickson, There’s a Huge Difference Between AI and Human Intelligence—So Let’s Stop 
Comparing Them, TECHTALKS (Aug. 21, 2018), https://bdtechtalks.com/2018/08/21/artificial-
intelligence-vs-human-mind-brain/ [https://perma.cc/4GHL-XENY]. 
 141 David Watson, The Rhetoric and Reality of Anthropomorphism in Artificial Intelligence, 29 
MINDS & MACHS. 417, 423 (2019). 
 142 Id.; Naveen Joshi, How Far Are We from Achieving Artificial General Intelligence?, FORBES 
(June 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/06/10/how-far-are-we-from-
achieving-artificial-general-intelligence/#338a679c6dc4 [https://perma.cc/BSX7-6UJE]; Sherise Tan, 
How to Train Your AI, REVAIN (Mar. 28, 2019), https://medium.com/revain/how-to-train-your-ai-
98113bdac101 [https://perma.cc/KUZ5-5L34]. 
 143 See infra notes 144–179 and accompanying text (defining AI, detailing its strengths and limi-
tations, and discussing its role in augmenting human researchers and workers). 
 144 See Calo, supra note 7, at 404 (“Al is best understood as a set of techniques aimed at approxi-
mating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.”); Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating 
Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 353, 362 (2016) (defining AI as “machines that are capable of performing tasks that, if per-
formed by a human, would be said to require intelligence”); Sean Semmler & Zeeve Rose, Artificial 
Intelligence: Application Today and Implications Tomorrow, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 86 (2017) 
(defining AI as “the process of simulating human intelligence through machine processes”). 
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tasks that would otherwise require human thinking.145 AI systems are often 
divided into two classifications: General AI and Narrow AI.146 General AI re-
fers to theoretical machines with science-fiction level capabilities that can rea-
son and understand the world around them at the same level as humans.147 In 
other words, such a machine could learn from experiences in the abstract way 
in which humans do.148 If an AI machine could reach this point, it would theo-
retically be capable of solving all the problems that a human could.149 Current-
ly, this level of AI is merely speculative, and experts are not certain when AI 
will reach this point.150 Other experts are skeptical that machines will ever 
reach this level, contending that human and machine intelligence are complete-
ly different.151 
Narrow AI refers to machines that focus on specific problems, typically 
within a single domain.152 Today, Narrow AI is the current state of AI ma-
chines.153 A subtype of existing Narrow AI, known as machine learning, refers 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Scherer, supra note 144, at 362. 
 146 Michael J. Garbade, Clearing the Confusion: AI vs Machine Learning vs Deep Learning Dif-
ferences, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Sept. 14, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/clearing-the-
confusion-ai-vs-machine-learning-vs-deep-learning-differences-fce69b21d5eb [https://perma.cc/6UUF-
3GKH]; Kathleen Walch, Rethinking Weak vs. Strong AI, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/10/04/rethinking-weak-vs-strong ai/#34016c3c6da3 [https://perma.cc/
4CY8-W7UC]. 
 147 Walch, supra note 146.  
 148 See id. (defining General AI as AI technology that would be able to perform all the cognitive 
tasks that humans are capable of); see also Dickson, supra note 140 (emphasizing the ability to think 
and reason abstractly as one of the ways in which human intelligence outshines AI).  
 149 Naveen Joshi, 7 Types of Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (June 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/06/19/7-types-of-artificial-intelligence/#15f91124233e [https://perma.
cc/Z3LH-YSE2]. 
 150 PHILIP C. JACKSON, JR., INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 62 (Dover Publ’n, 
Inc., 3d ed. 2019) (1974). A recent survey of 352 experts predicted that there is a 50% chance that 
General AI will exist by the year 2060. Katja Grace et al., Viewpoint: When Will AI Exceed Human 
Performance? Evidence from AI Experts, 62 J. A.I. RSCH. 729, 729–30 (2018). An earlier survey 
reported that, on average, experts estimated a 10% chance that AGI would develop by 2036, a 50% 
chance it would develop by 2081, and a 90% chance it would develop by 2183. Vincent C. Müller & 
Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMEN-
TAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 553, 563 (Vincent C. Müller ed., 2016).  
 151 See FRANÇOIS CHOLLET, DEEP LEARNING WITH PYTHON 8, 12 (2018) (stating that machine 
learning and human thought are entirely different things, and cautioning that “talk of human-level 
general intelligence shouldn’t be taken too seriously”); Dickson, supra note 140 (reasoning that AI 
machines cannot make the sort of general abstractions that enable human intelligence). See generally 
Toby Walsh, The Singularity May Never Be Near, AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 58, 58 (questioning whether 
AI will ever surpass human intelligence). 
 152 Jajal, supra note 138. 
 153 Ron Miller, Artificial Intelligence Is Not as Smart as You (or Elon Musk) Think, TECH
CRUNCH (July 25, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/25/artificial-intelligence-is-not-as-smart-as-
you-or-elon-musk-think/ [https://perma.cc/37D4-YJV7] (noting the differences between human intel-
ligence and machine learning, and explaining that AI machines, although exceptional at very narrow 
tasks, are incompetent at generalized tasks). 
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to machines that have the ability to learn through exposure to data rather than 
from conventional programming.154 Some of the most promising machine 
learning models employ artificial neural networks.155 These neural networks 
involve layers of processors, known as nodes, which are connected together in 
a manner that is loosely akin to the way in which neurons are connected to-
gether in the human brain.156 Nodes assign values to data signals that they re-
ceive from other nodes and decide whether to pass the signals on to the next 
node.157As this process is repeated, the AI machine will draw connections within 
the data and “learn” based on the similarities and patterns that it finds.158 
Deep learning, which enables AI to perform some narrowly defined tasks 
at a superhuman level, utilizes these neural networks across dozens or some-
times hundreds of layers.159 The term “deep” literally refers to the practice of 
stacking many neural layers on top of one another to apply machine learning 
on a large scale.160 Although partially inspired by the human brain, artificial 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Jef Akst, A Primer: Artificial Intelligence Versus Neural Networks, THESCIENTIST (May 1, 
2019), https://www.the-scientist.com/magazine-issue/artificial-intelligence-versus-neural-networks-
65802 [https://perma.cc/5T9U-Y358].  
 155 Bernard Marr, The Most Amazing Artificial Intelligence Milestones So Far, FORBES (Dec. 31, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/12/31/the-most-amazing-artificial-intelligence-
milestones-so-far/#13b618217753 [https://perma.cc/M48U-ZB5Z]. 
 156 Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial Intelligence Revolution Challenges Patent Eligibility 
Laws, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2017); Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS 
(Apr. 14, 2017), http://news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414 [https://
perma.cc/E559-MAC9]. The analogy between neural networks and the human brain is both common 
and controversial. See, e.g., CHOLLET, supra note 151, at 8 (lamenting comparisons between deep 
learning and the structure of the human brain as “confusing and counterproductive”); Neil Savage, 
Marriage of Mind and Machine, 571 NATURE 15, 16 (2019) (analogizing neural networks to the struc-
ture of neurons in the human brain).  
 157 Hardesty, supra note 156. Nodes make this decision by taking the sum of the values from all 
incoming connections and, should the sum exceed a threshold number, sending the number along all 
the node’s outgoing connections to other nodes. Id. If the sum of the values does not reach the thresh-
old number, then the node will not pass along the signal. Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 CHOLLET, supra note 151, at 8; Gary Marcus, Deep Learning: A Critical Appraisal 7 (Jan. 2, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00631.pdf [https://perma.cc/79UT-VL6C]; 
see Silver et al., supra note 2, at 1140 (stating that modern AI is capable of beating the best humans at 
chess and Go); Donna Lu, DeepMind’s StarCraft-Playing AI Beats 99.8 Per Cent of Human Gamers, 
NEWSCIENTIST (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2221840-deepminds-starcraft-
playing-ai-beats-99-8-per-cent-of-human-gamers/ [https://perma.cc/2TK9-H4RR] (reporting an AI 
machine’s success in the exceptionally complicated, online strategy game, StarCraft II); Andrew Ng, 
What Artificial Intelligence Can and Can’t Do Right Now, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
hbr.org/2016/11/what-artificial-intelligence-can-and-cant-do-right-now [https://perma.cc/MK6F-CNW3] 
(“If a typical person can do a mental task with less than one second of thought, we can probably au-
tomate it using AI either now or in the near future.”); CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., AI Beats Profes-
sionals in Six-Player Poker, SCIENCEDAILY (July 11, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2019/07/190711141343.htm [https://perma.cc/B7YE-EXNA] (detailing an AI machine’s Texas hold’em 
poker win against six professional players). 
 160 CHOLLET, supra note 151, at 8. 
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neural networks function quite different from human thought.161 Although in-
credibly adept at digesting large amounts of data, AI machines struggle when 
faced with tasks that require abstract thinking.162 
The same state-of-the-art AI machines that can analyze mounds of data 
infinitely faster than any human are often baffled at their first encounter with 
abstract tasks that would not stump a toddler, such as identifying types of ani-
mals immediately after learning about them for the first time.163 Humans, 
though much slower at processing data, make countless abstract generaliza-
tions with little effort.164 Humans also can draw conceptual understanding from 
limited information, whereas AI machines cannot.165 
In stark contrast to humans who require little information to generalize, 
AI machines require large amounts of meticulously screened datasets and the 
assistance of skilled programmers who can guide the machines as they interact 
with and learn from the data.166 For example, consider Watson, IBM’s famed 
AI system that defeated some of the very best human players at Jeopardy!.167 
This was no small feat considering the skill of the human participants and the 
often complicated way questions are posed on the game show.168 Nevertheless, 
Watson cannot take what it learned from developing this superhuman trivia 
ability and apply that information to other cognitive endeavors as a human 
can.169 Rather, programmers must input preselected datasets, which train Wat-
                                                                                                                           
 161 Id. 
 162 See Watson, supra note 141, at 422 (finding that deep learning AI machines are “brittle, inef-
ficient, and myopic” in comparison to human cognition). For example, in a recent study, researchers 
put an AI machine, known as DeepMind, up against a “highly constrained” version of an intelligence 
quotient test used to measure abstract reasoning in humans. David G.T. Barrett et al., Measuring Ab-
stract Reasoning in Neural Networks 8 (July 11, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1807.04225.pdf [https://perma.cc/55G6-BVBW]. Researchers trained DeepMind for the test by 
teaching it problems similar to those on the test. Adam Santoro et al., Measuring Abstract Reasoning 
in Neural Networks, DEEPMIND (July 11, 2018), https://deepmind.com/blog/article/measuring-
abstract-reasoning [https://perma.cc/63RH-QXKC]. DeepMind performed well on the test for prob-
lems that utilized the same abstract components as the practice sets, but even small changes between 
the training problems and the test problems would throw the machine off. Id. The study noted that 
“[e]ven within this constrained domain . . . [AI] performed strikingly poorly when required to extrapo-
late to inputs beyond their experience, or to deal with entirely unfamiliar attributes.” Barrett et al., 
supra, at 8. 
 163 Watson, supra note 141, at 423; Alison Gopnik, Will A.I. Ever Be Smarter Than a Four-Year-
Old?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/will-ai-
ever-be-smarter-than-four-year-old-180971259/ [https://perma.cc/X55Z-75ZJ]. 
 164 Gopnik, supra note 163.  
 165 Id. 
 166 Tan, supra note 142. 
 167 Markoff, supra note 2. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Ying Chen et al., IBM Watson: How Cognitive Computing Can Be Applied to Big Data Chal-
lenges in Life Sciences Research, 38 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 688, 688, 691 (2016); see Kyle Babi-
nowich, Building the Ultimate Corpus for Watson Knowledge Studio Training, MEDIUM (Jan. 18, 
2018), https://medium.com/with-watson/building-the-ultimate-corpus-for-watson-knowledge-studio-
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son to conduct specific tasks.170 If programmers want to create a version of 
Watson that aids in medical research, they must first train Watson to recognize 
patterns and assign varying weights to scientific studies, news reports, opinion 
pieces, and other relevant documents or datasets.171 Only after programmers 
have supplied Watson with datasets preselected to teach it to recognize im-
portant patterns and carefully curate its responses, can Watson successfully 
embark on this new task.172 
Even after programmers have fully trained and integrated AI machines into 
a specific role, they often perform better when paired with human experts than 
on their own.173 For example, one of AI’s most promising modern applications is 
in the field of radiology, wherein AI programs have proven remarkably effective 
at detecting cancer.174 In one study, an AI program designed to detect cancer 
cells in slide images of lymph nodes performed this task with an error rate of 
7.5%, whereas a human pathologist had an error rate of 3.5%.175 With the com-
bination of both human and AI analysis, the error rate plunged to a mere 0.5%.176 
The errors made by human pathologists were usually different from those made 
by the AI program and vice versa.177 Thus, the capabilities of the human path-
ologist and the AI program complemented one another, the strengths of each 
offsetting the shortcomings of the other.178 Pairing AI computing and human 
brainpower has become the prevailing trend in most industries; rather than re-
                                                                                                                           
training-af6a7f1fc976 [https://perma.cc/XZ9X-SHUJ] (discussing tips to train Watson Knowledge 
Studio, IBM’s AI system, to accomplish new tasks); James Vincent, AI R&D Is Booming, but General 
Intelligence Is Still Out of Reach, THE VERGE (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/12/
21010671/ai-index-report-2019-machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-data-progress [https://perma.
cc/C937-Z54K] (“With very few exceptions, AI systems trained at one task can’t transfer what 
they’ve learned to another.”). 
 170 Chen et al., supra note 169, at 688, 691; Babinowich, supra note 169. 
 171 Babinowich, supra note 169. Watson may already aid in medical research and will likely do so 
more often as programmers improve the AI training process and the datasets they use to train it. Na-
dine Bakkar et al., Artificial Intelligence in Neurodegenerative Disease Research: Use of IBM Watson 
to Identify Additional RNA‑Binding Proteins Altered in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 135 ACTA 
NEUROPATHOLOGICA 227, 243 (2018); Chen et al., supra note 169, at 698–99.  
 172 Chen et al., supra note 169, at 688, 691. 
 173 See e.g., Louis Rosenberg et al., Artificial Swarm Intelligence Employed to Amplify Diagnostic 
Accuracy in Radiology, in 9TH ANNUAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRONICS, AND MOBILE 
COMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 1186, 1191 (2018), https://11s1ty2quyfy2qbmao3bwxzc-wpengine.
netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ASI-for-Radiology-IEEE-IEMCON-2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AK2J-9E3Z] (finding that a team of radiologists using a deep learning AI system performed 
better than both those same radiologists working individually and the AI system operating without any 
human involvement). 
 174 Id. at 1186. 
 175 Dayong Wang et al., Deep Learning for Identifying Metastatic Breast Cancer 1, 5 (June 18, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.05718.pdf [https://perma.cc/32LA-2HTX]. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 6. 
 178 Id. at 5–6. 
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placing humans, AI is typically used to augment human expertise, with both hu-
man and machine intelligence working in tandem to solve complex problems.179 
III. AI AND THE OBVIOUSNESS DOCTRINE: PERCEIVED FLAWS IN THE 
EXISTING STANDARD AND CURRENT SOLUTIONS 
As AI continues to improve, it will likely play a larger role in invention 
development.180 AI augments researchers across many industries, contributing 
at varying levels to the development of patent-worthy inventions.181 AI’s in-
creasing role in developing inventions has led some commentators to worry 
that existing doctrine will fail to keep up.182 These commentators are con-
cerned that the current obviousness standard focuses only on the skills that 
human inventors bring to the table.183 The data processing, pattern recognition, 
and other functions that AI systems perform elevate the innovative capabilities 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Thomas Davenport & Ravi Kalakota, The Potential for Artificial Intelligence in 
Healthcare, 6 FUTURE HEALTHCARE J. 94, 97–98 (2019) (examining current and upcoming integra-
tions of AI in the healthcare field, and finding that AI will likely enhance, rather than displace, human 
healthcare clinicians); Jeannette Paschen et al., Collaborative Intelligence: How Human and Artificial 
Intelligence Create Value Along the B2B Sales Funnel, 63 BUS. HORIZONS 1, 10 (2020) (finding that 
“AI will enhance, not replace” salespeople and stating that “humans still hold an upper hand in using 
intuition to deal with contradictory or uncertain information and to derive insights and implications”); 
Brian Whitworth & Hokyoung Ryu, A Comparison of Human and Computer Information Processing, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND NETWORKING 230, 237–38 (Info. Sci. Refer-
ence, 2d ed. 2009) (stating that “the future of computers may lie not in replacing people but in becom-
ing more human compatible,” and listing a number of recent innovations that utilize human and com-
puter collaboration); Ken Goldberg, The Robot-Human Alliance, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-robot-human-alliance-1497213576 [https://perma.cc/K7RC-9UNH] 
(describing how human and machine collaboration enables many innovative systems, such as 
Google’s search engine and Netflix’s video recommendation software); H. James Wilson & Paul R. 
Daugherty, Collaborative Intelligence: Humans and AI Are Joining Forces, HARV. BUS. REV. (2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/07/collaborative-intelligence-humans-and-ai-are-joining-forces [https://perma.cc/
GF6U-MREM] (researching AI implementation across fifteen hundred companies and finding that 
companies achieved greater improvements in efficiency when AI augmented, rather than replaced, 
human workers). 
 180 Iain M. Cockburn et al., The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Innovation, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: AN AGENDA 2 (Ajay K. Agrawal et al. eds., 2019); see Edd Gent, 
Why AI Won’t Replace Human Inventors, RACONTEUR (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.raconteur.net/
business-innovation/innovation-automation [https://perma.cc/JDQ3-SUGH] (discussing the increasing 
role that AI may play in developing new technologies as researchers leverage its ability to track pat-
terns across data to identify new solutions).  
 181 Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35. 
 182 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07; Abbott, supra note 28, at 5. 
 183 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07; Abbott, supra note 28, at 35. 
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of workers who use them.184 Thus, as the use of AI becomes standardized with-
in an industry, the inventive capability of the average worker will increase.185 
Commentators worry that the current obviousness doctrine fails to under-
stand how AI technology influences the modern inventive process.186 If true, 
this perceived blind spot in the doctrine would fail to equip the PHOSITA with 
the AI machines used by average workers in the field.187 Impairing the PHOS-
ITA’s skill level in this way would result in the PHOSITA finding fewer inven-
tions obvious.188 Thus, inventions evaluated according to such a weakened 
PHOSITA would pass the obviousness test more easily and obtain patents that 
an appropriately calibrated PHOSITA standard would have disallowed.189 
Section A of this Part discusses concerns regarding existing doctrine as 
applied to AI inventing.190 Section B details recent proposals aimed at address-
ing these perceived doctrinal deficiencies.191 
A. Perceived Insufficiencies in the Current Obviousness Doctrine 
Some scholars worry that as AI technology becomes increasingly wide-
spread, existing doctrine will fail to keep pace.192 One criticism alleges that the 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35; Susan Y. Tull & Paula E. Miller, Patenting Artifi-
cial Intelligence: Issues of Obviousness, Inventorship, and Patent Eligibility, in 1 J. ROBOTICS, A.I. & 
L. 313, 320 (2018). 
 185 Tull & Miller, supra note 184, at 320; Ana Ramalho, Patentability of AI-Generated Inven-
tions: Is a Reform of the Patent System Needed?, INST. INTELL. PROP., FOUND. FOR INTELL. PROP. 
JAPAN 25 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168703 [https://perma.cc/
W3HL-MS6M]. 
 186 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07; Abbott, supra note 28, at 35. 
 187 Erica Fraser, Computers as Inventors—Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence 
on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED 305, 321 (2016). 
 188 KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE, WORLD ECON. F., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
COLLIDES WITH PATENT LAW 12 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_
Innovation_Protecting_Patent_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/U37D-QK3Y]. 
 189 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 107; Abbott, supra note 28, at 5. 
 190 See infra Part III.A. 
 191 See infra Part III.B. 
 192 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 107 (finding the current application of the obviousness doctrine 
lacking in the face of machine inventiveness); Abbott, supra note 28, at 51–52 (asserting that patent 
law needs to be proactive in responding to AI technology, given that current doctrines are ill-suited for 
upcoming changes); Ravid & Liu, supra note 6, at 2252–53 (arguing that patent incentives are inappo-
site to AI inventions); Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 36–51 (discussing issues related to the 
patentability of AI inventions, including who should be named as the inventor and when computer-
generated material should invalidate prior art). As previously mentioned, a threshold issue of current 
debate is whether creations performed autonomously by AI machines are eligible for patent protec-
tion. Compare Abbott, supra note 8, at 1103–04 (arguing that allowing AI machines to be inventors 
would encourage innovation by incentivizing the further development of inventive machines), and 
Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 50 (same), with Clifford, supra note 15, at 1702–03 (asserting 
that, unless AI machines achieve a level of consciousness such that they might respond to intellectual 
property incentives, their works should not qualify for protection), and Samuelson, supra note 28, at 
1199–1200 (asserting that machines should not receive intellectual property protections because they 
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current obviousness analysis fails to consider adequately the role that AI plays 
in inventing.193 This school of thought contends that inventions created using 
AI possess an unfair advantage because current law does not “explicitly” scru-
tinize the tools being used by workers in the field.194 
For example, suppose that AI is responsible for the bulk of the work in de-
veloping an invention.195 Because there is no requirement to report the use of AI, 
human inventors may simply file a patent on the invention and enjoy the bene-
fits, even though the AI machine was the real source of ingenuity.196 If the obvi-
ousness inquiry does not account for AI’s role within an industry, then courts 
will not apply an appropriately elevated PHOSITA standard to the invention.197 
Thus, a court may find the invention nonobvious, even when the human inventor 
has exercised only ordinary skill.198 This would result in too low an obviousness 
standard, as patents would issue on inventions that the average skilled worker 
could have created using ordinary skill and applying standard tools of the 
trade.199 Furthermore, such a standard could lead to a slew of undeserved patents 
that would limit future research and impose heavy burdens on society.200 
                                                                                                                           
do not need to be incentivized to create). Regardless of whether AI machines may be inventors, real 
workers will increasingly use AI. See NARRATIVE SCIENCE, OUTLOOK ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
IN THE ENTERPRISE 3 (2019), https://narrativescience.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Research-
Report_Outlook-on-AI-for-the-Enterprise.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT7X-BVHG] (surveying 196 busi-
ness and technology executives and reporting that AI implementation across multiple industries had 
increased from 38% in 2017 to 61% in 2018). To put it another way, those results amount to a 60% 
increase in AI implementation within the span of one year. Id.; see Spyros Makridakis, The Forthcom-
ing Artificial Intelligence (AI) Revolution: Its Impact on Society and Firms, 90 FUTURES 46, 58 (2017) 
(stating that AI technology has the potential to surpass “both the Industrial and digital revolutions put 
together” in how it transforms society and “affect[s] practically all tasks currently performed by hu-
mans”). 
 193 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07; Abbott, supra note 28, at 35. 
 194 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 102 (stating that existing patent law “does not explicitly take 
into account the introduction of improved invention augmentation technology”); Abbott, supra note 
28, at 6 (advocating for changes to existing doctrine that would “more explicitly take into account the 
fact that machines are already augmenting the capabilities of workers”). 
 195 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 103–05 (providing a hypothetical in which a commonly availa-
ble AI program invents a new automobile frame while the future patent applicant enjoys a bag of 
popcorn in front of the television). 
 196 See Daryl Lim, AI & IP: Innovation & Creativity in an Age of Accelerated Change, 52 AKRON 
L. REV. 813, 861 (2018) (stating that patent applicants are not required to disclose the use of AI in 
developing an invention); Ramalho, supra note 185, at 25 (same). 
 197 See Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and Patent Law, in 18 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 489, 503 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (noting 
that some inventions “may simply be the result of massive computational power that allows for rapid 
trial and error searching . . . while from the perspective of the PHOSITA without the aid of thinking 
machines the results produced may be surprising”).  
 198 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07. 
 199 Id.; Abbott, supra note 28, at 34. 
 200 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 107. 
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B. Proposals to Modify Existing Doctrine to Emphasize the  
Role of AI in Developing Inventions 
One proposal to modify the obviousness doctrine to ensure that it adapts 
to the use of AI technology is to require patent applicants to disclose when AI 
has contributed to a claimed invention.201 Currently, patent applicants are not 
required to disclose what technology they used to develop an invention.202 
Proponents suggest that, when applying for a patent, inventors should be re-
quired to disclose the extent to which AI aided in the development of an inven-
tion.203 Over time, patent offices could gauge how significantly AI has contrib-
uted to the inventive process within a field by analyzing these disclosures.204 
The obviousness test could then use this information to determine whether the 
use of AI is pervasive throughout an industry, such that a PHOSITA would 
have access to it.205 
A second proposal, advanced by at least one commentator, suggests that 
the PHOSITA standard eventually should be replaced by an “inventive ma-
chine standard.”206 An “inventive machine,” under this theory, is an AI ma-
chine that is capable of inventing without human involvement, such that “were 
[it] a natural person, it would qualify as a patent inventor.”207 According to this 
commentator, multiple existing AI programs are capable of autonomous inven-
tion, and thus qualify as “inventive machines.”208 This commentator contends 
that once these AI machines become the standard method for developing in-
ventions within a field, the PHOSITA should be replaced by the average in-
                                                                                                                           
 201 See id. at 105–06 (discussing the shortcomings of existing doctrine and noting that patent 
applicants are not required to disclose their use of AI); Abbott, supra note 28, at 6 (arguing that patent 
offices should require patent applicants to disclose the use of AI in developing a claimed invention); 
Lim, supra note 196, at 861 (“It may be better for AI to be identified in a patent application as long as 
AI is used.”); Ramalho, supra note 185, at 25–26 (stating that a problem with the current patent sys-
tem is that applicants are not required to disclose the use of AI). 
 202 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring that inventors disclose how to make and use the claimed 
invention, but not requiring inventors to disclose how they discovered the invention). 
 203 Abbott, supra note 28, at 6; Ramalho, supra note 185, at 25–26. 
 204 Abbott, supra note 28, at 6. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 37; see also Tull & Miller, supra note 184, at 320 (hypothesizing that as technology 
continues to improve “AI may become the ‘person’ of skill in the art”); Vertinsky, supra note 197, at 
502 (suggesting that the existence of modern “thinking machines” may necessitate changing patent 
law’s PHOSITA to “some kind of machine/person combination or ‘M/PHOSITA’”). The “inventive 
machine standard” comes from Professor Ryan Abbott, who is easily one of the most prolific propo-
nents of what he and others see as a pressing need to update existing patent laws to keep up with mod-
ern AI. See Results of Ryan Abbott, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=
ErytXL0AAAAJ&hl=en [https://perma.cc/CK22-HG5J] (listing a number of Professor Abbott’s pub-
lications, many of which warn that current rules and regulations are failing to keep up with AI’s rapid 
evolution). 
 207 Abbott, supra note 28, at 4. 
 208 Id. 
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ventive machine within the industry.209 Therefore, this proposal attempts to cali-
brate the obviousness doctrine according to actual industry practice by highlight-
ing that the AI machine is doing the inventing, rather than the human.210 
These proposals attempt to raise the obviousness standard, as it relates to 
AI inventions, in order to address a perceived failure of the doctrine to account 
for the use of AI in developing inventions.211 
IV. THE MODERN TEST FOR OBVIOUSNESS IS EQUIPPED TO ADDRESS THE 
INCREASING ROLE THAT AI MACHINES PLAY IN DEVELOPING INVENTIONS 
The current obviousness doctrine is appropriately calibrated to address 
the expanding role that AI plays in inventing.212 Requiring patent applicants to 
disclose the use of AI technology could lead courts to conceptualize the 
PHOSITA according to the skill exhibited by the invention at issue, rather than 
according to the average level of skill in the field.213 Like the Federal Circuit’s 
past reliance on the “education level of the inventor,” this modification could 
erroneously equip the PHOSITA with the AI capabilities employed by the in-
ventor, rather than by average workers in the field.214 This would result in too 
high of an obviousness standard for many inventions created with the aid of 
AI.215 In contrast, replacing the PHOSITA with an “inventive machine” stand-
ard could, rather than raising the obviousness standard in line with the use of 
AI, lower the obviousness standard by failing to account for human contribu-
tion in inventing.216 
Section A of this Part avers that existing doctrine will reach the correct re-
sult as applied to AI inventions.217 Section B further argues that requiring pa-
tent applicants to disclose the use of AI could confuse the obviousness analysis 
and lead to erroneous results.218 Finally, Section C contends that replacing the 
PHOSITA with an inventive machine could result in too low an obviousness 
standard.219 
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2021] The Human’s Obvious Role in the Artificial Intelligence Era 1443 
A. The Current Obviousness Doctrine Will Reach the Correct  
Results for Inventions Created Using AI Technology 
The thrust of the modern obviousness analysis focuses not on the inven-
tor, but rather on the invention itself.220 The test hinges on whether a claimed 
invention presents a significant advancement over prior art.221 Therefore, the 
mere fact that an invention is created in part or entirely by an AI machine does 
not render it obvious under current doctrine.222 Section 103 of the Leahy-Smith 
AIA explicitly reaffirmed that the “manner in which [an] invention was made” 
will not support an obviousness determination.223 With or without the use of AI 
technology, the determination comes down to whether an average worker, with 
knowledge of all relevant, preexisting technology would find the claimed in-
vention obvious.224 
For example, an invention created by a team of researchers over the 
course of five years is not necessarily any less obvious than if it had been cre-
ated by one researcher in a few days using an AI machine.225 Suppose that, in 
the above example, researchers in the inventor’s field widely use AI technolo-
gy and that the researcher using the AI is a worker of ordinary skill.226 The re-
searchers who labored away for five years should not receive a patent for 
something that would have been obvious within a few days had they applied 
the tools commonly used in the industry.227 Far from incentivizing innovation, 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See Burgess, supra note 77, at 74 (reasoning that the scope of analogous art should not be 
determined based upon what the actual inventor considered, but instead upon what a PHOSITA would 
find pertinent to solving the problem); Gingo, supra note 106, at 98–99 (arguing that courts should not 
consider “the inventor’s level of skill” when identifying the PHOSITA because the PHOSITA is 
meant to represent the skill of an average practitioner, rather than that of the actual inventor); Meara, 
supra note 96, at 279–80 (stating that consideration of the skill level of the actual inventor “has prov-
en to be problematic” because it blurs the line between the actual inventor and the average practition-
er represented by the PHOSITA). 
 221 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 222 See William Samore, Artificial Intelligence and the Patent System: Can a New Tool Render a 
Once Patentable Idea Obvious?, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 113, 130 (2013) (applying existing 
obviousness doctrine to an AI-created invention and concluding that the invention would be nonobvi-
ous so long as the PHOSITA did not have access to the same AI technology as the inventor). 
 223 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 104–05 (reasoning that once AI technology is common within a 
field inventors who fail to make use of the technology, these inventors will then be held to the same 
standard as if they had used AI). 
 226 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (framing a hypothetical scenario, which illustrates 
that obviousness is not about how long or how many people work to create a given invention, but 
rather how much the invention advances the field of study). 
 227 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (stating that as new technologies become publicly available, they 
will set a new obviousness standard which future inventions must overcome); Olson, supra note 36, at 
183 (reasoning that the goal of patents is to promote innovation). 
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allowing a patent in such a situation would reward the researchers for failing to 
stay up-to-date on the standard technology used in the field.228 
In contrast, suppose that someone creates a superior AI machine or finds a 
way to incorporate AI in the inventive process better than their peers, which in 
turn results in an invention.229 In this instance, the inventor has created a non-
obvious invention and the fact that, in order to do so, the inventor ended up 
creating a better tool should not defeat his or her right to a patent.230 The obvi-
ousness test, laid out by the Supreme Court, in 2006, in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., arrives at the correct result for either situation by expanding the 
scope of prior art according to the standard technologies in the industry and 
endowing the PHOSITA with the ordinary skill and creativity that would lead 
the PHOSITA to use such technology.231 
The analogous art test limits the scope of prior art to preexisting technol-
ogies within the “field of the endeavor” and to those technologies that are rea-
sonably pertinent to the problem solved by the invention.232 This test recogniz-
es the ingenuity of those who examine technology from one sphere of study 
and apply it to something completely different.233 At some point, the ability to 
draw inspiration from prior art in one practice area and apply it to solve a prob-
lem in a completely different area is nonobvious.234 Arguably, AI is best suited 
to enhancing human capabilities in this particular area of invention.235 Unlike 
human inventors who sometimes have mental barriers and preconceptions that 
inhibit looking for inspiration far-afield, AI machines do not have such hang-
                                                                                                                           
 228 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (stating that once technological advances become part of society’s 
shared knowledge, they “define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more”); PLOTKIN, 
supra note 9, at 104–05 (reasoning that, once AI is commonly used within a field, inventors who fail 
to use AI should not receive patents for inventions that would have been obvious had they used such 
technology). 
 229 See PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 51–61 (crediting AI with inventing the Oral-B Cross Action 
toothbrush, a new controller, a specialized antenna for use in space, and other novel inventions). 
 230 See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 50 (arguing that it is costly to develop AI and use 
it to generate inventions). The use of AI in inventing will “accelerate inventive activity, and that ac-
celeration is, in and of itself, the type of innovation that society should desire to—and already does—
reward with patents.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 231 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19; see infra notes 232–243 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
widespread use of AI could expand the scope of the prior art under the analogous arts doctrine and 
raise the PHOSITA’s skill level). 
 232 In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 233 Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1895). 
 234 Id. 
 235 See Abbott, supra note 28, at 37 (stating that AI is capable of sifting through enormous 
amounts of data on its way to finding a solution); Lim, supra note 196, at 863 (stating that AI can 
“thread non-analogous art and is unfettered by biases due to prior failures”); see also Hattenbach & 
Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35 (describing an instance in which an AI machine employs its superior 
computing power to literally “brute-force” creative content). 
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ups.236 Rather, AI machines simply look for patterns within preexisting tech-
nology by assigning values to the data signals they receive.237 Not only will AI 
better equip humans to look beyond the blurry lines separating one field from 
the next, but it has the computing power to sift through an endless array of data 
for a solution to a problem.238 
In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court imposed upon 
inventors the heightened burden of showing nonobviousness against the wider 
scope of prior art incorporated by new technologies.239 As a result, once AI is 
common in a given industry, inventors will have to meet the heightened burden 
of showing nonobviousness based on what a PHOSITA aided by AI—as well as 
any other widely available technology—would find reasonably pertinent to the 
problem solved by the invention.240 Further, in KSR, in 2007, the Supreme Court 
endowed the PHOSITA with the “inferences and creative steps” that an ordinary 
worker would exhibit.241 Such a PHOSITA would take advantage of the relevant 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See James Vincent, DeepMind’s Go-Playing AI Doesn’t Need Human Help to Beat Us Any-
more, THE VERGE (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/18/16495548/deepmind-ai-go-
alphago-zero-self-taught [https://perma.cc/4V5U-QKWL] (“By not using human data . . . we’ve actu-
ally removed the constraints of human knowledge . . . . It’s therefore able to create knowledge itself 
from first principles; from a blank slate [. . . .] This enables it to be much more powerful than previous 
versions.”) (quoting the lead programmer of AlphaGo Zero).  
 237 Chandu Siva, Machine Learning and Pattern Recognition, DZONE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
dzone.com/articles/machine-learning-and-pattern-recognition [https://perma.cc/3HFG-SYTC]. 
 238 Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35–36; Ramalho, supra note 185, at 24. 
 239 See 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (“[T]he ambit of applicable art in given fields of science has wid-
ened by disciplines unheard of a half century ago. It is but an evenhanded application to require that 
those persons granted the benefit of a patent monopoly be charged with an awareness of these changed 
conditions.”). In Graham, the Supreme Court consolidated three cases and invalidated two patents on 
obviousness grounds. Id. at 25–26, 37. The first patent concerned a plow shank that improved prior art 
by moving the hinge plate (part of the apparatus that attached individual shanks to the plow frame) 
from below the plow shank, to above it. Id. at 24–25. This change allowed for greater flexion and 
decreased the tendency of the shank to break when it encountered an obstruction. Id. The Court inval-
idated the patent, holding that a PHOSITA attempting to allow for greater flexion in the plow shank 
would find the patentee’s solution obvious. Id. The other patent at issue in Graham involved a bottle-
cap for dispensing insecticides. Id. at 27. Although a prior art reference had made use of the same type 
of device, the patentee claimed that it was not pertinent to the pump sprayers used in the insecticide 
industry because it concerned pouring spouts. Id. at 35. The Court rejected this characterization, hold-
ing that “[c]losure devices in such a closely related art as pouring spouts for liquid containers are at 
the very least pertinent references.” Id. 
 240 See id. at 19 (holding that the scope of the prior art expands in line with the capabilities of 
modern technologies). 
 241 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). In KSR, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on an “adjustable 
pedal” with an electronic sensor that allowed a computer to adjust the air and fuel supplied to the 
engine. Id. at 422. The Court detailed prior art, describing each individual step of the patented design, 
which the inventor had combined to form the claimed invention. Id. at 408–10. The prior art disclosed 
methods of allowing adjustment of the accelerator pedal so that drivers of various heights could reach 
it without sitting too close to the steering wheel, instructed that electronic sensors perform better when 
placed on the pedal apparatus than when placed within the engine, dictated that sensors should be 
placed on fixed portions of the pedal apparatus at pivot points such that the sensor could detect pedal 
movements, and provided for interchangeable “modular sensors” that could be used for various vehi-
1446 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1413 
technologies employed in the industry to solve routine problems.242 Thus, cur-
rent doctrine accommodates the increasing role that AI plays in inventing by 
expanding the scope of prior art to include tools that a PHOSITA would have 
access to and by endowing the PHOSITA with the good sense to use them.243 
B. Requiring Patent Applicants to Disclose the Use of AI  
Would Confuse the Obviousness Analysis 
Some scholars have suggested that patent offices should require appli-
cants to disclose the extent to which they used AI to develop a claimed inven-
tion.244 This requirement stems from a perceived inability of the current doc-
trine to recognize the role that AI plays in creating inventions.245 If obvious-
ness does not take into account the use of AI, then the PHOSITA will not use 
AI when evaluating an invention even when the technology is widely used 
within the field.246 This would result in too low an obviousness standard for 
inventions in industries in which the use of AI is pervasive.247 
Requiring inventors to disclose the extent to which AI aided in the devel-
opment of an invention has the potential to confuse the analysis, so as to hold 
inventions created using AI to a higher standard than those created without 
it.248 Similar to the Federal Circuit’s retreat from relying heavily on the educa-
tion level of the actual inventor as a factor for determining PHOSITA, patent 
offices and courts should not focus on the abilities of the individual AI system 
employed during an invention’s development.249 Sound obviousness analysis 
                                                                                                                           
cles. Id. The patentee’s improvement combined these teachings by placing an electronic sensor on a 
“fixed pivot point” of the adjustable pedal apparatus. Id. at 411. The Court invalidated the patent on 
obviousness grounds, noting that the “marketplace . . . created a strong incentive to convert mechani-
cal pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art taught a number of methods for achieving this ad-
vance.” Id. at 424. The Court held that the claimed invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA 
of “ordinary skill” and “ordinary creativity.” Id. at 421–22. 
 242 Id. at 418. 
 243 See id. (stating that courts will look to the creative reasoning that ordinary skilled works would 
exhibit); Graham, 383 U.S. at 19 (holding that the scope of relevant prior art expands in relation to 
modern technological methods). 
 244 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07 (stating that current patent law does not require inventors to 
disclose the use of AI in developing an invention, and reasoning that this enables the modern patent 
applicant to acquire a patent on inventions created using ordinary skill); Abbott, supra note 28, at 6 
(stating that patent offices should require applicants to report the use of AI in developing claimed 
inventions). 
 245 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07; Abbott, supra note 28, at 5–6. 
 246 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 105–07. 
 247 Id. 
 248 See supra notes 249–260 and accompanying text (arguing that requiring inventors to disclose 
the use of AI could lead courts to apply an inappropriately elevated obviousness standard to inven-
tions created by or with the assistance of AI). 
 249 See In re Coutts, 726 F. App’x 791, 796 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the education level of 
the actual inventor is only useful if it is especially indicative of the average level within the field, and 
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requires an important distinction between the capabilities of the actual inventor 
as compared to those of the average skilled worker in the field.250 The inquiry 
should not focus on the abilities of the actual AI involved in creating the 
claimed invention, but rather on the standard within the industry.251 Past cases 
have shown that focusing too closely on the expertise of the inventor as a fac-
tor for determining PHOSITA can confound the doctrine and lead courts to 
conceptualize the PHOSITA based on the actual inventor’s education level ra-
ther than that possessed by average workers in the field.252 Requiring appli-
cants to disclose the use of AI in an invention likely will repeat these same 
mistakes.253 
As inventors increasingly use AI, patent offices and courts must deter-
mine whether the use of AI is widespread in the industry from which a given 
invention arises.254 If it is sufficiently widespread, officials must determine the 
capabilities of the average AI system.255 In conducting these inquiries, the fact 
that an applicant reported the use of AI could lead patent offices and courts to 
attribute the same capabilities to the PHOSITA, despite average workers in the 
field not having such capabilities.256 Misconstruing the PHOSITA’s skill level 
in this way would frustrate the objective inquiry required by § 103 and defy 
the statute’s explicit prohibition against rendering an invention obvious based 
on how it was created.257 
                                                                                                                           
reaffirming that the PHOSITA is an objective representation of the ordinary worker rather than the 
actual inventor). 
 250 See Mandel, supra note 56, at 123 (“[S]ociety’s interest is in the objective likelihood of some-
one else solving the problem, not whether the invention was obvious to the inventor subjectively.”). 
 251 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson & Pers. Prods. Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that courts look to the capabilities of the average skilled worker within the 
industry, rather than the means employed by the actual inventor). 
 252 See Gingo, supra note 106, at 90–92 (cataloging Federal Circuit cases that oscillate between 
relying on the educational level of the inventor as a factor for identifying the PHOSITA, omitting it as 
a factor, or explicitly disregarding it); Mandel, supra note 56, at 73 (noting that courts frequently 
determine the PHOSITA’s skill level based on the skill of the actual inventor, and arguing that such 
practice “displays a remarkable hindsight bias” and “transforms a supposedly objective standard into a 
more subjective analysis based on the inventor’s particular education and training”). 
 253 See Douglas Y’Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Ever Necessary to Resolve Claim Construction 
Disputes?, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 567, 605 (1999) (“[T]he actual inventor’s skill is 
irrelevant because it does not represent a person of ordinary skill is of course, bedrock patent law.”). 
 254 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); Samore, supra note 222, at 130. 
 255 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Samore, supra note 222, at 130. 
 256 See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that 
the lower court relied on “all-too-often misconstrued and now obsolete principles of the obviousness 
inquiry” when it focused on the actual inventor’s level of skill, rather than the standard level of skill in 
the field). 
 257 35 U.S.C. § 103; see Gingo, supra note 106, at 95 (arguing that focusing too closely on the 
skill level of the actual inventor cuts against both the first sentence of § 103, which requires an objec-
tive inquiry based on what a PHOSITA would find obvious, and the second sentence, which provides 
that obviousness should not depend on the method of invention). 
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Patents should encourage the development of improved AI machines.258 
An obviousness test that looks to the capabilities of the AI employed by the 
actual inventor, rather than the capabilities of the average skilled worker, 
would negate this incentive.259 An invention created using superior AI, for 
which the inventor likely incurred significant costs to develop or acquire it, 
would face a higher bar for showing nonobviousness than inventors who used 
standard AI or no AI technology at all.260 
C. The PHOSITA Should Not Be Replaced By an Inventive Machine 
At least one commentator has suggested that once AI becomes the stand-
ard means of solving problems within a field, the PHOSITA should be replaced 
with an “inventive machine.”261 Perhaps if General AI ever comes to fruition, a 
paradigm shift from a PHOSITA to a machine of ordinary capabilities may be 
justified.262 If AI continues to fall into the category of Narrow AI, however, AI 
machines should be thought of as tools employed by a PHOSITA.263 This is not 
to say that Narrow AI machines could never develop nonobvious inventions 
with minimal human involvement—in fact, reports indicate that some AI ma-
chines, such as the DABUS, may have developed inventions on their own.264 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 50 (arguing that allowing patents on claims gener-
ated by or with the aid of AI machines will incentivize further AI development). 
 259 See Yelderman, supra note 49, at 1224–26 (explaining that properly formulated patentability 
requirements indicate to the market that the patent system will protect deserving inventions, thereby 
incentivizing innovation). 
 260 See Mandel, supra note 56, at 73 (stating that the actual inventor’s level of skill often deter-
mines the level of skill of the PHOSITA, even though this is in direct contrast with the purpose of the 
PHOSITA standard). 
 261 See Abbott, supra note 28, at 37 (“[T]he skilled person should be an inventive machine when 
the standard approach to research in a field or with respect to a particular problem is to use an in-
ventive machine . . . .”); see also Tull & Miller, supra note 184, at 320 (“At some point, AI may be-
come the ‘person’ of skill in the art, possessing actual knowledge of all known publications, patents, 
and prior art, transforming the hypothetical construct into reality.”); Vertinsky, supra note 197, at 502 
(“With thinking machines in the equation, however, policymakers might have to consider whether the 
PHOSITA should be modified to include thinking machines—perhaps some kind of machine/person 
combination or ‘M/PHOSITA.’”). 
 262 See Nick Heath, What Is Artificial General Intelligence?, ZDNET (Aug. 22, 2018), https://
www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-artificial-general-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/VDP8-3NFY] (stating 
that General AI could do all the things that humans can do, while also possessing the type of com-
mand over data that defines existing computers’ greatest strengths). 
 263 See Edd Gent, Why AI Won’t Replace Human Inventors, RACONTEUR (Dec. 9, 2019), https://
www.raconteur.net/technology/artificial-intelligence/innovation-automation/ [https://perma.cc/5TQW-
9NPG] (stating that “AI and humans have complimentary skills,” and reporting that AI is more likely 
to enhance rather than replace human innovators); see also Watson, supra note 141, at 422–24 (alleg-
ing that, against certain obstacles such as limited or flawed data, AI machines are “brittle, inefficient, 
and myopic” compared to the brains of humans (emphasis omitted)). 
 264 Angela Chen, Can an AI Be an Inventor? Not Yet., MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/615020/ai-inventor-patent-dabus-intellectual-property-uk-european-
patent-office-law/ [https://perma.cc/L27J-C2HM]. 
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Rather it is important because prematurely removing the “person” from the 
PHOSITA standard could result in some of the same problems as the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid application of the TSM test.265 Under the TSM test, courts 
looked only to explicit TSMs within the prior art to support an obviousness 
determination.266 Similarly, replacing the “person” in PHOSITA with an “in-
ventive machine” would require courts to look only to the sorts of data that the 
average AI machine would comprehend.267 This standard would disregard the 
important role that humans often play in designing and directing AI machines, 
and interpreting the data that they produce.268 AI is unlikely to displace humans 
altogether because humans and AI operate very differently.269 For many inven-
tions, humans and machines work in tandem to solve problems.270 If patterns 
of past innovation hold true, the role of humans in the development of inven-
tions will simply shift.271 AI will automate many of the calculations and repeti-
tive testing that human inventors have had to perform in the past.272 This will 
free human inventors to focus their abilities on the more generalized tasks, 
where human intelligence outshines AI.273 Simply stated, humans likely will 
continue to play a role in developing inventions even if that role takes on a 
different form.274 
As the KSR Court noted, design preferences, market trends, and other in-
centives can prompt a PHOSITA to find a solution that it otherwise might not 
have found.275 Applying this to the use of AI technology in developing new 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid application of the TSM test and, instead, requiring that courts apply a flexible approach, which 
takes into account “common knowledge and common sense” (quoting Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. 
C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). 
 266 ACS Hosp. Sys. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 267 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (stating that obviousness “cannot be confined by a formalistic con-
ception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of 
published articles and the explicit content of issued patents”); Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 897 (rea-
soning that a PHOSITA “bring[s] more to a problem than may be found in written prior art, including 
training, judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge acquired through field experience”). 
 268 See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 897 (“Scientific and technological work involve the applica-
tion of craft skills that are familiar to practitioners but defy explicit articulation.”). 
 269 See infra notes 159–179 and accompanying text (discussing important differences between 
human intelligence and AI); see also Watson, supra note 141, at 435 (discussing ethical issues sur-
rounding modern AI models, and arguing that equating human and machine intelligence is “mislead-
ing and potentially dangerous”). 
 270 Gent, supra note 263. 
 271 See Erik Brynjolfsson et al., What Can Machines Learn and What Does It Mean for Occupa-
tions and the Economy?, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 43, 44, 47 (2018) (stating that although AI could 
revolutionize a number of jobs, “full automation will be less significant than the reengineering of 
processes and the reorganization of tasks”). 
 272 Wilson & Daugherty, supra note 179. 
 273 Dickson, supra note 140. 
 274 Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 271, at 46–47. 
 275 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). 
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inventions, one can imagine instances in which a skilled human would be more 
in-tune to these trends and other abstract understandings than an AI ma-
chine.276 Although AI machines can absorb infinitely more data than humans, 
the generalized happenings within a market or industry that might steer a mod-
ern human inventor toward a new discovery would likely allude even the most 
sophisticated AI system in many instances.277 As AI continues to improve, 
there may be some instances in which having a skilled machine standard might 
not result in a different outcome than a PHOSITA using AI standard.278 But 
there likely would be many other instances in which the abstract, big picture 
intuition of a skilled human worker would find an invention obvious where the 
AI machine alone would not.279 
Patent protection is meant only for those inventions that exhibit a signifi-
cant advancement over prior art.280 If the only thing inhibiting an obviousness 
determination for a particular invention is that the standard AI machine within 
an industry cannot extrapolate the abstract principles that a human of ordinary 
skill and creativity would have, then the invention is not a significant ad-
vancement.281 Thus, in fields in which the use of AI machines in developing 
new inventions becomes commonplace, the test should look to what a PHOSI-
TA using AI technology would find obvious rather than attempting to replace 
the PHOSITA with an “inventive machine.”282 
                                                                                                                           
 276 See Marcus, supra note 159, at 7 (“[H]umans are far more efficient in learning complex rules 
than deep learning systems are . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 277 See id. at 7–9 (stating that AI can often provide accurate answers for well-defined problems if 
given sufficient high quality data, but “[i]n problems where data are limited, deep learning often is not 
an ideal solution”). 
 278 PLOTKIN, supra note 9, at 51–61 (discussing various inventions that AI reportedly created with 
little to no human involvement). 
 279 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 10–11 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [http://perma.
cc/BHL5-ZKAB] (discussing instances in which humans and machines perform better together than 
either could by itself). These successful human and AI team-ups are becoming increasingly more 
common. Id. For instance, inferior AI engines can often defeat superior chess programs when provid-
ed with a skilled human partner. Id. This success occurs even when both of the AI chess programs are 
stronger than the human player. Id. 
 280 Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883). 
 281 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (describing the various amor-
phous factors that a court might expect a PHOSITA to consider, such as “interrelated teachings of 
multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the market-
place; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art”). 
 282 See Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 271, at 47 (projecting that, for most professions, continued 
development of AI technology is more likely to reshape the role of humans rather than replacing them 
altogether). Beyond encouraging researchers to begin an inquiry, the patent incentive is also beneficial 
when a researcher already has made a promising discovery and is deciding whether to develop the 
discovery into a patentable invention. Merges, supra note 96, at 33. This principle could work in har-
mony with the complementary role that AI often performs in the inventive process, in that the AI 
machine could present an outside-the-box result and the human could develop it into a patentable 
2021] The Human’s Obvious Role in the Artificial Intelligence Era 1451 
CONCLUSION 
As AI continues to evolve, a flexible approach that accounts for the vary-
ing roles that AI plays in developing inventions is most appropriate. Current 
obviousness doctrine adequately fulfills this role. Recent proposals aimed at 
addressing perceived deficiencies in the doctrine, as it applies to AI, would 
confuse the doctrine and lead to erroneous results. Requiring applicants to dis-
close the use of AI could lead patent offices and courts to endow the PHOSITA 
with the AI capabilities possessed by the actual inventor before such technolo-
gy is standard within the field. Further, replacing the PHOSITA with an in-
ventive machine standard could lead to an overly rigid test that fails to consid-
er the role that humans will continue to play in inventing. 
New technologies present new challenges. As the patent system adapts to 
addressing the needs of expanding AI capability, it is important that past les-
sons inform modern practice. Even minor attempts to alter the doctrine based 
on whether a given technology contributes to an invention could throw the test 
into disarray. Current obviousness analysis provides a sufficiently flexible 
standard for evaluating inventions created by or with the aid of AI technology. 
Unless or until current obviousness doctrine proves unable to accommodate 
this expanding technology, we should not rush to alter it. 
CONNOR ROMM 
 
                                                                                                                           
invention. See Wilson & Daugherty, supra note 179 (describing how an inventor can provide an AI 
machine with parameters for a new chair design, such as load-bearing capacity, height of the seat from 
the ground, and sample designs, which are aesthetically pleasing, and the AI machine will then gener-
ate models that the inventor can choose from). This liberates the human inventor to focus on the high-
level decision-making and product development for which human intelligence is particularly suited. 
Id. 
 
 
 
